


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7 May 1985

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AUSTRALIA

BEAZLEY'S CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE MILITARY VIEWED

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 7 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Hugh White]

[Text]

EVERYONE KNOWS that Kim Beazley is the son of a politician. It shows. He takes to politics with utter confidence, effortlessly practising the hereditary skills of the family trade.

But he is also an experienced strategist, and he is setting about his job as Minister for Defence with a clear campaign plan.

Mr Beazley believes that the Defence Forces are seriously ill-matched to the strategic tasks that face them, and he is setting out to bring them up to date. And the axe seems certain to fall hardest on the Army.

Bouncing into the defence portfolio at 37, and after only five years in Parliament, he has ordered a stringent re-examination of Australia's defence needs in the light of the strategic thinking of the past 10 years.

The need is urgent, he believes, because the spiraling cost of defence equipment means that inefficient use of defence resources cannot be afforded.

Last month, in his first major speech as Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley spelt out his concerns to the Army Staff College at Queenscliff by referring back to Richard Nixon's famous words at Guam in 1969 which inaugurated the modern strategic age in our hemisphere:

"As far as the problems of military defence are concerned, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, the United States is going to encourage and has the right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian countries themselves."

Mr Beazley told the college: "The Guam Doctrine's influence on Australian Defence planning should not be

underestimated. In a single simple statement it... dealt a fatal blow to the premises upon which Australian defence policy had traditionally been based".

Forward Defence, fighting in Asia alongside great and powerful friends, was out. Continental defence was in, and so was self-reliance.

But, Mr Beazley says, "despite the fact that these changes occurred nearly two decades ago", the old thinking "is still recognisable in the structure and underlying doctrine of the defence force."

"Should the force structure we had in the 1960s be the same under very different strategic circumstances?"

Earlier this month Mr Beazley appointed Mr Paul Dibb — another noted strategist and former intelligence chief — to answer that question. Mr Dibb will conduct a one-year review of the defence forces; his job is to say what defence capabilities Australia needs to match Australia's current strategic position.

Australia's basic strategic position at the moment is fairly clear and stable, Mr Beazley believes. Across the mainstream political spectrum the essential elements are recognised to be: a lack of imminent threat, a strong alliance with the US, and a need nonetheless to be prepared to defend our continent without assistance from outside.

Until Mr Dibb reports, Mr Beazley is naturally reluctant to speculate on the sort of changes that will be required to bring Australia's defence forces into line with this strategic outlook.

But it is clear that some of the military capabilities which were thought essential in the 1960s will no longer seem so today, while others

which have been passed over before will now seem essential.

On the retrenchment side, the Army seems certain to be the big loser. The Army is still largely equipped for large-scale engagements against heavily-equipped foes — for example its 103 leopard tanks, 700 armoured personnel carriers and its artillery.

Such equipment made some sense for an army whose main task was to aid our allies on the foreign battlefields of the 1950s and 1960s, but it makes less sense to Mr Beazley today.

THE ARMY'S role in the defence of continental Australia is likely to be distinctly subsidiary to those of the other services.

Mr Beazley told the *Herald* recently that it is "unquestionable that when you're looking at the defence of Australia against major invasion, the defence has to be mounted by airpower and submarines.

"Those are the capabilities which can inflict massive damage on a potential invader."

In other words, major attacks are to be defeated by the Navy and Air Force at sea, not on land.

The Army's role is to deal with lower-level threats — small scale incursions intended to embarrass or pressure an Australian Government, not to overthrow it, he says.

"A potential low-level harasser will operate at a force level which will not be that readily detectable. "There is only one force which is capable of coping with that problem, and that is the Army."

Given this new role, the future of the Army's treasured armoured corps is clearly in doubt.

"Do we need vast fleets of armoured vehicles capable of performing in the NATO-type context?" Mr Beazley asked. "The answer might well be no".

This won't win the genial Mr Beazley any friends in the Army. The Leopard tanks are its pride and joy, and it has even hoped to get 1,000 new armoured personnel carriers as well.

Instead, Mr Dibb is likely to recommend that the Army should get more air mobility, so that lightly-equipped troops can be deployed quickly — along the lines of the fledgling Operational Deployment Force in Townsville — to repel small raiding parties.

In case the Army feels victimised, Mr Beazley is quick to point out that the

Navy has already made huge sacrifices in the name of Continental Defence — the loss of its aircraft carrier and the Fleet Air Arm.

IN THE Air Force, Mr Dibb's attention may be drawn to the RAAF units still stationed at Butterworth in Malaysia, especially the Mirage fighter squadron there. Although the Australian presence has undoubted diplomatic significance, in purely military terms the deployment may be seen as a relic of the earlier strategic era of forward defence, and be due for review.

Although one of the aims of the exercise is to get rid of unsuitable capabilities, Mr Dibb's review is not intended simply to find ways to cut defence expenditure.

In fact Mr Beazley is committed to maintaining Australia's defence expenditure at around the current level of 2.7 per cent of GDP. But he wants to ensure that that money is spent more efficiently. Hitherto, Mr Beazley says, equipment decisions have been made purely on the basis of replacing existing capabilities, without proper questioning of whether those capabilities were still necessary.

He believes this approach is no longer possible, because the cost of defence equipment is rising so fast. To update all present defence capabilities Australia would need to double the national defence effort.

This is politically impossible, according to Mr Beazley. We just have to be more selective in what we buy.

Mr Dibb explains that becoming more self-reliant without spending more money "is a matter of priorities, allocation and, above all, consistency and coherence in the force structure, which many commentators have said we do not have at present".

Two areas in which Mr Beazley believes expansion of Australia's capabilities will be likely, following Mr Dibb's review, are airborne early-warning aircraft and in-flight refuelling for the airforce — both of which are already under consideration.

Mr Beazley recognises that any substantial changes to Australia's defence force will be unpopular in some vocal circles, especially when it comes to abandoning or scaling down some capabilities.

But he is confident that he will have the support of his party. He points to a long tradition of support for defence self-reliance among all factions of the

ALP, and relies on being able to demonstrate that he is making the defence budget work for Australia.

"That gives a Defence Minister enormous strength in Cabinet, provided he can demonstrate that he is achieving it."

And Mr Beazley is not the sort of politician to try to crash his reforms through. He is content to stick at the task for three or four parliamentary terms.

"I see myself as a very cautious person. Defence is a very appropriate area for a small 'c' conservative attitude.

"I have only ever had one ambition in politics, and that was this job. Now all the ambitions I have in politics relate to this portfolio."

These pledges of dedication might be dismissed as the normal political cant, were it not for the fact that Mr Beazley's interest in defence and strategic issues has been life-long. After an MA at the University of WA, he went to Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship where he read International Relations for a Masters of Philosophy degree, and wrote a thesis on super-power competition in the Indian Ocean. After that he taught international relations at WA until he won preselection for Swan in 1980, at the third attempt.

CSO: 4200/817

FIJI

BRIEFS

SUGAR PRODUCTION COMEBACK--Fiji, which has the largest Island economy, took a lambasting from two devastating hurricanes followed by a lengthy drought. One of the consequences was that it could not fill its sugar export quota to New Zealand and suspended sugar exports to this country for about a year. Its total sugar production, during the previous 12-month period, 276,000 tonnes, was almost half the average output of earlier years. Export receipts for sugar were about 14 per cent lower than normal and, because of hurricane damage to hotels and guest houses, the number of tourists visiting Fiji dropped by 6 per cent. Income from tourism dropped 13.5 per cent. In direct contrast, Fiji did manage to increase other industrial production by 9 per cent. Sugar production is now in excess of 400,000 tonnes a year and the country is planning 5 to 6 per cent growth in its tourist industry. [Excerpt] [Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 11 Mar 85 p 6]

CSO: 4200/828

INDONESIA

SUHARTO FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 27 Feb 85 pp 1, 5

[Text] President Soeharto has emphasized the importance of increased trade among the ASEAN countries. Minister of Industry Hartarto reported this after yesterday's meeting with the president in his Cendana Street residence, Jakarta.

The minister said that up to now there has not been much trade among members of ASEAN because the business world has not known much about the situations of its members. Besides that, the industrialization pattern of the members is almost the same. "So that in fact there sometimes is competition," he added.

The minister said that President Soeharto's emphasis on the importance of increased trade among the nations of ASEAN is in line with the statement recently made by Dr Mahathir Mohammad, the prime minister of Malaysia. Opening the 17th meeting of ASEAN economic ministers in Kuala Lumpur at the beginning of February, Mahathir described ASEAN economic cooperation as "insufficient and difficult," arguing that "a more serious relationship" should be created to develop regional trade and economic ties.

Relatively Low

As an example, the minister said, trade among the ASEAN countries is now only 15 percent of the total trade activities of all members of ASEAN, with the exception of Brunei. On the other hand, ASEAN trade with the 10 members of the European Economic Community is about 50 percent of ASEAN's total trade activity.

Between 1975 and 1981 the amount of Indonesian exports to ASEAN countries was on the average 10.8 percent of Indonesia's total yearly exports, while Indonesia's imports from the other ASEAN nations in the same period were 11.9 percent of Indonesia's total imports.

Indonesia's exports during that period were mostly to Singapore--83.4 percent of Indonesia's total exports to the ASEAN countries; 11.1 percent went to the Philippines and the rest to the other countries. Indonesian imports from the other ASEAN countries between 1975 and 1981 came from Singapore (68.3 percent), Thailand (20.2 percent), the Philippines (8.4 percent) and Malaysia (3.2 percent). At that time Brunei Darussalam was not yet a member of ASEAN.

According to the UN's Yearly Statistics on International Trade, only 14.3 percent of Indonesia's total 1979 exports of 15,590 million dollars was to other ASEAN

countries. Imports were 11.8 percent of Indonesia's total imports of 7,183 million dollars.

The amount of intra-ASEAN trade in 1979 was also around that amount. About 20 percent of Malaysia's exports came from ASEAN countries [as published], while imports were 14.4 percent. Export and import figures respectively for other ASEAN countries were: for the Philippines, 4 and 6 percent; for Singapore, 23.9 and 28.4 percent; and for Thailand (1978), 15.5 and 6 percent.

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CSO:4213/179

INDONESIA

INTERVIEW WITH FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT SPOKESMAN

Northcole INSIDE INDONESIA in English Mar 85 pp 22-26

[Interview with Rex Rumakiek in Melbourne, 19 November]

[Text]

Could you give us an account of the history of the OPM?

The OPM started with the experience of Indonesia taking over from the Netherlands as administrator of West Papua. The agreement between the Netherlands and Australia signed in Canberra in 1957, was that the two countries would work together to develop the whole island in preparation for independence on both sides. The first West Papuan political party started in the same year, and lower levels of administration were handed over to local people. By 1959 all the sub-district level and most middle-level positions were in our hands. By 1961 51 percent of the public service was under our control. So in fact we had capable administrators in every field, ready to take over from the Dutch. At the same time, the Australian side was working through a similar process of handing over administration to the Papua New Guineans, which included incorporating its own territory, Papua, with the trust territory of New Guinea into a single administration. The plan was that both sides would become independent in 1970. It was no secret that some government members in both Australia and the Netherlands looked forward to the unification of the whole island of New Guinea, with the understanding that we are the same people. We still claim that both countries have a moral responsibility to West Papua because they encouraged nationalism in the first place.

But then administration of our side was transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia through the New York Agreement of 15 August 1962. The New York Agreement stated that Indonesia would continue with the programme of decolonisation the Netherlands had started. But when Indonesia moved in, the public service was taken over and our people pushed out to the lowest levels, the schooling system was changed, political parties were banned, elections were abolished and all administrators appointed as under the Indonesian system.

They began a campaign to persuade West Papuans of the need to integrate with Indonesia. One of the earliest moves was to escort leaders from every part of the community on a

free sight-seeing tour of Jakarta. At the end of the trip they asked these people to sign a declaration of loyalty to Indonesia.

Towards the end of 1964 Indonesia withdrew its membership of the United Nations and Sukarno declared that Indonesia no longer carried the UN-imposed responsibility to organise the Act of Free Choice in 1969. After that statement, many of us felt there was no further chance to determine our own future through peaceful means. We decided to take up arms, to fight for our freedom.

All the preliminary organising was done underground. Some people in Biak started early in February of the following year, but their plans were uncovered and most of them fled to Jakarta. We found Jakarta was quite safe, so it became the place where all our early plans were made. I was a student in Jogjakarta at the time.

The inaugural plan was in two parts, to be carried out in Jakarta and West Papua respectively. There were a number of West Papuan military people based in Jakarta. They were supposed to take part in a parachute jumping demonstration for Indonesian Independence Day celebrations on 17 August. The plan was to hijack the Hercules in which they were all to be carried, and join the OPM. As things turned out, that part of the plan failed but the other part went ahead. On 28 July, 1965 OPM soldiers in Manukware wiped out a whole Indonesian garrison. If the plan in Jakarta had succeeded, it could have been a very big rebellion. Nevertheless, that was when the OPM was born.

How does the OPM operate?

Our fighting strategy is primarily a response to Indonesian military activities. Indonesian soldiers tend to act like members of an occupying army, raping women and destroying villages. The OPM directly challenges battalions who engage in these terrorist activities. We endeavour to protect villagers, without drawing attention to any village which might make it a target for the Indonesians.

But the OPM is not just a military operation. The military is the active, moving part, but we have other operations under cover in different parts of the country. These include health, education and commerce. Operation is difficult but we try to provide what Indonesia fails to provide in these basic areas. We have nine district commands and 116 sub-district commands.

The OPM is united in its aim to bring the country to independence. Internal fighting occurs as it does within our tribal system, but we don't see this as any serious threat to the future stability of our country. We have no solid financial backing from any other country. We depend on friends in countries like Australia, and for arms we rely on capturing Indonesian guns. It's safer and cheaper that way.

What are the ethnic origins of the West Papuan people?

The West Papuan people are the same as the people from PNG, racially, environmentally and culturally. We are Melanesian, we follow Melanesian traditions of land ownership and kinship. There are few obvious cultural links with

the peoples of South-East Asia, besides the fact that some of our languages are related to the Austronesian language family, in which Indonesian is also included. Our old stories describe the Asians stealing our people to sell as slaves. These stories are also found in the Javanese Chronicles, how our people were traded as slaves to Southeast Asia and even further to China. They refer to us as *jangi* or the 'black race' and to our country as the 'far east'. The present South China Sea was also known as the Jangi Sea during the period of busy slave trading. At a later stage in the slave trade, somewhere between the 16th and 18th century, they used the name *papua*, which means 'black with fuzzy hair'. This word belongs to a mixed language used by the Maluku people and the traders. In the Maluku language itself there is a word *pa-ua* which means 'no father'. This means they can come and get us any time because there is no leader to protect us.

We have very few cultural ties with Maluku. The hierarchy patterns and systems of leadership are very different. However in colonial times Dutch administration included our region under the administration of Maluku.

What was the attitude of the Indonesian administration to the West Papuan traditional way of life?

They showed no respect for our traditions from the beginning, and in fact openly regarded them as 'primitive' and not to be encouraged. This included even agricultural systems. Some of our highlands people use a sophisticated drainage system, centuries old but ideally suited to the local conditions. Even this system was forcibly overridden by the Indonesians.

Pig meat is traditionally an important food, especially to the highlands people. But because of their religious beliefs the Indonesians wanted to change that and introduced animals like goats and chickens. The introduced animals were carriers of some infectious diseases including anthrax, so the health of the people has suffered badly as a consequence.

I could cite many other examples, such as the singing of traditional songs being banned, or the use of the word 'Papua' being prohibited — you were called subversive for this. I see these as steps in a deliberate attempt to kill off Papuan national identity. On the other hand they openly encourage intermarriage with Javanese. I remember my time in Java as a student. All of us were encouraged to marry a Javanese before we went home. The weddings of some of my friends to Javanese were financed by the government. Once we had a mass wedding of 17 couples, the celebration financed completely by the government. I suppose it was a form of bribery.

Education is another story. In other parts of Indonesia for the first three years of school you are taught in the local vernacular. But in West Papua they start straight away with *Bahasa Indonesia*, Indonesian songs and Javanese dances. Local languages and other cultural forms are not taught officially anywhere in West Papua. This is where the ethnologist Arnold Ap came in. He started a campaign to promote Melanesian culture, which is what the Indonesians undertook to do in the 1962 agreement. He was killed for that. The military claimed he was a member of the OPM, but when you're already dead it's hard to defend yourself.

Before Indonesia's own independence in 1945, both Hatta and Sukarno are on record as having supported the West Papuan right to self-determination. When did that government change its view?

Sukarno's change of heart came about gradually during the 1950s as he developed his philosophy about European colonial powers. He began making statements about the real motives of the Dutch in preparing the West Papuan people for independence, and claimed their continued presence in the region was a threat to Indonesia. His opinion was probably influenced by the knowledge that there was vast mineral wealth in West Papua.

How was the Act of Free Choice¹ eventually carried out?

Indonesia rejoined the UN in 1967 under Suharto, so it was again responsible for fulfilling our right to self determination. To begin with, the government sent a research team to interview all the influential leaders in the community. Even the regional councils, whose members were appointed by Indonesia, themselves declared that it should be conducted on a one man, one vote system. It was clear to the research team that if they went ahead under that system of voting, the people's decision would be 100 percent in favour of independence. They reported that poor communication networks would make the country too expensive to organise for a one man, one vote system.

Their alternative was to hand pick 1025 people to represent the entire population of one and a half million. A few of these representatives were actually Indonesians who had been living in West Papua for some time! The regional councils were supposed to be responsible for organising the Act, but because they had stated their preference so clearly a new council was appointed to make the arrangements. The representatives from each region were chosen and put into training camps about four months prior to the date of the referendum. While in camp they were given radios and other luxuries they were not used to. On the actual voting day, the representatives were gathered in a large single room. Indonesian officials opened up with a beautiful speech. Then each person stood up and repeated what he had memorised during the four months in training camps. That was the vote.

Journalists and a special United Nations observer, Dr Ortiz Sanz from Bolivia, were present. In his report Dr Sanz maintained some reservations about whether the rights of the West Papuan people had been fulfilled. However, the United Nations had another motive for wishing to see a resolution to the affair besides the rights of our people, and that was the potential for conflict between two member nations, Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The OPM's response was to organise a big demonstration. At that time I was already in the bush, but I went down to the town to work towards this demonstration. It was Easter Day, so when the soldiers saw 2000 people marching the streets of Jayapura they thought it was just an ordinary Christian procession. We sang Christian songs and marched until we reached the residence of the UN special envoy, then suddenly unfurled our banners and the soldiers realised too late it

was a political demonstration. We presented a petition to the United Nations representative, saying our right to self determination had not been fulfilled. The UN representative advised us to go home before we were shot, but the people were too excited.

The soldiers did open fire with their machine guns — above people's heads so no one was killed but the crowd scattered. Ninety people were arrested straight away as the organisers. None was ever brought to trial and some have never been released. Six of my own friends are amongst this number. We have tried to find out their whereabouts but without any success. Some of their families have been to the police and in return have been threatened and harassed. Naturally they are afraid to go any further.

Transmigration seems to be a political move as well as an economic one in West Papua. How is it affecting the people?

Transmigration was actually started during the Dutch colonial time. In its present Indonesian form, there are two types, official and spontaneous. The official number is always quoted by Indonesia when mention is made of the programme, although it is a lot smaller than the real figure.

A Javanese will move to West Papua under the official transmigration programme, and when he finds a house and a secure job he will send a letter to his relatives inviting them to join him. So you end up with the whole family, anything from 12 to 20 people. Their status is legal, their movement is encouraged.

The official forecast to the end of the current five year plan is 700,000, so you could safely say the real figure will be about 2,000,000. The government plans to settle 10 million Javanese in West Papua by the year 2000, which could have serious implications for the whole island of New Guinea. Resettlement is heavily concentrated along the border regions. Their plan is to cut off our cultural and traditional links with the people of PNG. It is also a means of controlling the movements of the OPM across the border. Indonesia has built three roads across the border into PNG, into areas which are not suitable for any kind of agricultural development, so one could speculate about their designs on future expansion into PNG.

Other areas for the resettlement of transmigrants are coastal regions and areas close to the location of rich mineral deposits, many of which are of course already being exploited.

Transmigrants who move into farming areas often find the environment quite alien; working the jungle is not the same as working a Javanese rice field. Many of them give up and move to town. They get jobs as manual labourers or petty administrators in the public service, or some set up their own small businesses. If you look at a photograph of Jayapura at present, it's difficult to distinguish it from any Javanese town. Alternatively, the transmigrants move to the mineral deposits and form the workforce for the mining operations. West Papuans are rarely employed on the mining sites, as selection is all done by Javanese who give preference to their own people.

Transmigration has had an effect on the traditional ownership of land. It is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the huge number of refugees now living in PNG. One tribe near Merauke in the south had its entire traditional land taken over for transmigration resettlement. The whole tribe, about 8,000 people, fled to PNG early this year.

The Melanesian system of land holding is common throughout the South Pacific including West Papua and PNG. Land is traditionally owned by the whole tribe. An individual has no right to claim a particular piece of land as his own property, he can use it and claim two-thirds of the produce, but the land is always held in common by the clan. There are cases where people from other tribes, or foreigners who marry people from the clan, are allowed to use the land under the same conditions. Now, with the modern influence, blocks of land have been set aside which you can rent but are not supposed to own. This is a way of adapting the traditional system to modern needs without destroying the basis of it. It has been shown to be very effective in PNG and Vanuatu, where the governments have shown genuine respect for traditional systems of land ownership. The main problem with the Melanesian system is its susceptibility to interference from outsiders. We are beginning to realise the kind of long term planning which goes into the operations of multinational companies. The Purari dam project in PNG², which encountered a lot of local opposition a few years ago, was in fact part of a plan to provide almost unlimited supplies of electricity to mining companies in PNG and West Papua. It's the same with the transmigration programme. We are now aware that resettlement areas have been strategically located around mining sites, to provide cheap Javanese labour the foreign companies don't have to house or otherwise look after.

A recent decision by Indonesia is to divide West Papua into three provinces. Under Indonesian law, every province can carry up to 30,000 soldiers, which is the number in West Papua at present. When this decision is carried out, we will have 90,000 soldiers, not to mention three sets of Javanese officials and administrators.

Can you comment on violations of human rights?

Every second West Papuan has his or her own story to tell about Indonesian oppression. People disappear, and anyone who enquires as to their whereabouts is threatened. Many times it starts with detention for a few days, then they might be released for a week or two before being picked up again. Then they disappear. When we go hunting we sometimes find our own people half-decomposed with bullet wounds in them.

In my home village, for example, about eight people went gardening one day and never returned. A week later they were found in the jungle, dead with bullet wounds on them. No one knows who is responsible, of course, but it happens so commonly people blame it on the military. After all, who would do that to their own relatives? This sort of information is kept quiet by Indonesia, you've probably never read about it in the Australian press.

My own cousin was shot in both legs and dragged eight kilometres behind a car. They left him to bleed to death in the middle of the village. They drew a circle 10 metres around him and said anyone who stepped inside the circle would get shot. Soldiers found him outside the village early in the morning, and that was enough for him to be suspected. One of my friends described how three people were shot in front of the whole village, as examples of what happens to OPM supporters.

Approximately 11,000 West Papuans have fled since February this year to become refugees in PNG. About 4,000 others who have left since the Indonesian occupation in 1963, are living in PNG, Sweden, Senegal or Greece. I myself am a stateless person since I left PNG.

Why is Indonesia so determined to hold onto West Papua?

The mineral wealth is very attractive. Indonesia is a nation heavily in debt. During the campaign against the Netherlands for control of West Papua Indonesia negotiated a loan from Russia of 400 million dollars for military assistance and hardware, and further loans of large amounts from other western countries. They have never been in a financial position to pay back these loans. So in 1969 a number of western countries, Canada, the United States, Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, formed a committee to act as guarantors to the continuation of the Indonesian government. In turn Indonesia allows all these countries to freely exploit the minerals in West Papua. As a result there are a large number of multinational companies operating in the country, some paying no taxes to the Indonesian government, and with no responsibility to provide any benefits for our people. The minerals being exploited include copper, gold, silver, oil, uranium, iridium, nickel and natural gas. Satellite mapping surveys have shown the whole country to be a rich mineral reserve.

Massive logging operations are being carried out, with serious effects on large areas, birds, animals and plants. Tribal people depend on hunting animals for food, and use special timbers for their carving.

What signs of progress have you seen since your last visit to Australia?

The nations within the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement all support us morally, although so far Vanuatu is the only nation which has given us official recognition. This year they brought our case to the attention of the South Pacific Forum and the United Nations. We hope it will be put on the agenda for discussion at both forums. In the past Australia, PNG and Indonesia have obstructed our case being discussed at any international forums. We hope that both Australia and PNG have changed their views.

When you achieve your independence would you see your country as moving within the Melanesian or Asian sphere?

Effectively we are on the border of the two regions, so we would want to establish relationships with both. Probably we

would have a close relationship with Indonesia, as we already have a language in common. Strategically, our independence would provide greater security for Australia and the region, with the possibility of federation with PNG.

¹In accordance with the UN right to self-determination, Indonesia was responsible for organising a referendum where West Papuans could choose either to remain with Indonesia, or to become independent. This referendum, known as the Act of Free Choice, was held in 1969, although according to UN conditions. West Papuans argue that they were not given an opportunity to state the majority opinion.

²The Purari hydro-electric project was mounted in the early 1970s with a combination of Japanese and Australian expertise and finance, with the particular aim of providing cheap and plentiful power to what was to be the largest aluminium smelter in the world. The plans were shelved early in 1979. See Purari: Overpowering PNG? IDA, Melbourne, 1978

CSO: 4200/816

INDONESIA

EAST JAVA PPP URGED TO SETTLE DISPUTE

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 27 Feb 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] The East Java Provincial Executive Board (DPW) of the United Development Party (PPP), which is still suffering from the prolonged dispute between the Hisbullah Huda and Hasjim Latief factions, was urged to settle that dispute immediately since it will only harm the organization.

Bachtiar Sutiono, deputy chairman of the East Java DPW of the PPP and a member of Parliament from the FPP [United Development Faction], made this statement to MERDEKA in Surabaya, emphasizing that if the year-long dispute is not settled, the East Java DPW of the PPP will be left behind in preparations for the 1987 general elections.

Bachtiar Sutiono, who has declared himself neutral in the dispute, therefore hopes that the two sides are prepared to wake up to this damaging situation and are determined to overcome the problems without dredging up old problems.

"If old problems are dredged up again, there will be no end to it," he stated.

"If one side forces its will on the other side, one of them will become a victim and this will sow the seeds of future disputes," he added.

Without Injury

When asked for the best way to overcome the dispute, Bachtiar Sutiono, who once stated that he did not know a thing about it when his name appeared on the roster of a "rival DPW PPP" being formed by Hisbullah Huda and friends at the beginning of last August, said that it should be via an Islamic brotherhood approach, without injuring either side.

He said that the settlement must be flawless, receiving structural support from below, from above and from all sides.

"So one side must take the initiative in seeking a settlement," he said.

"Without all of that, it is hard to find a meeting point. The result will be an even worse atmosphere," he added.

Bachtiar Sutiono said that he feels optimistic that the East Java DPW PPP dispute can be settled in 2 months at most.

When asked why 2 months, Bachtiar Sutiono, well-known as an East Java NU [Muslim Scholars' Party] figure, said that if the dispute is not settled in 2 months, the East Java DPW of the PPP will be "swallowed up" by time.

He also affirmed that H J. Naro has not yet come to East Java, as originally planned, to meet with the East Java provincial level government.

9846

CSO:4213/179

INDONESIA

INCREASED TRANSMIGRATION TO IRIAN DISCOURAGED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 27 Feb 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Sending transmigrants to Irian Jaya should not be increased. In fact, plans that have already been made under PELITA [5-Year Plan] IV should be rescheduled. In that way, the goals will be in line with hopes. "Moving people is easy. Moving people to Irian Jaya is easy; as long as the planes are able it can be done. But is that a transmigration program?" asked Gunawan Sumodiningrat, Ph.D., who is on the Staff of the Village and Regional Development Research Center of Gadjah Mada University (P3PK UGM).

Minister of Transmigration Martono, after being received by the president at the Bina Graha [president's office], explained that transmigration to Irian Jaya will not be decreased; in fact, it will be increased. It will not be carried out recklessly. It will be done carefully, taking into account the rather large cultural gap between the newcomers and the natives of the area.

On UGM's Bulaksumur campus yesterday afternoon Gunawan said, "Without referring to the possibility of social conflict such as Minister Martono has brought up, from the economic viewpoint alone there are many obstacles which we must clear away before sending transmigrants to Irian Jaya." He pointed to limiting factors such as the relatively large distance from the point of origin, the high costs, the need to tame nature and to improve coordination. "It would be better to reschedule the plans for PELITA IV," said Gunawan firmly.

Limiting Obstacles

In the middle of January a 7-man team from the P3PK UGM led by Prof Dr Mubyarto examined transmigration to Irian Jaya. The team left at the invitation of Minister Martono. Gunawan Sumodiningrat was one of the members of the team.

Based on the observations made by that team, it was concluded that the area has great potential for transmigration, especially for agricultural land for food crops. Even though the potential is great, it was pointed out, many problems must be taken care of thoroughly before Irian Jaya can really be declared ready to receive transmigrants.

Although Minister Martono stated that under PELITA IV the government's goal is to send 136,000 families to Irian Jaya, official figures show that 137,000 families, or 691,000 people, will be placed there. This figure represents a drastic increase over the number of transmigrants already placed there--14,196 families, or 59,704 people--up to the end of PELITA III.

"This means that the increase has been extraordinary, almost tenfold," said Gunawan, who thinks that plans to send so many people there are too optimistic. He wonders whether such a large number can possibly be achieved.

His doubts are based on facts and experience. Besides the fact that there are many complex limiting obstacles in the field, recent experience has also shown that many transmigration plans do not reach their target. For example, at the end of 1984 only 200 people out of a planned 500 were actually sent, far below the number projected.

Savage

Gunawan showed that transmigration is not merely moving people from Java to other places. Transmigration must be seen as an effort to improve people's standard of living, both the newcomers' and the local residents'. Therefore, attention must be paid to their basic living conditions.

As for realities in the field, Irian Jaya has certain special characteristics--a very large area, a relatively low level of development compared to other areas and very different natural conditions from Java. Based on this, he said, special attention must be paid to an examination of the minimal preconditions of the socioeconomic aspects of the situation. Preconditions include preparation of the settlement and entrepreneurial lands and factors for expediting economic activities such as marketing goods, both goods needed by the transmigrants and their own produce.

He said that part of the transmigration area in Irian Jaya lies in a flood zone. Besides that, salinification reaches 80 km from the coastline, making it difficult to find drinking water and to prepare agricultural land. Special building materials, roads and means of transportation are also needed. All of this increases the costs of preparing transmigrant land.

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CSO:4213/179

INDONESIA

SUDOMO ON FBSI LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Jakarta SUARA KARYA in Indonesian 22 Feb 85 p 3

[Text] It is hoped that the All-Indonesia Labor Federation (FBSI), which celebrated its 12th anniversary on 20 February, will simplify its organization and begin to rejuvenate its leadership. Sudomo, minister of labor, made this proposal on Wednesday evening [20 February] in his remarks at the 12th-anniversary celebration of this organization, a day also celebrated as National Workers Day, at the Department of Labor offices in Jakarta.

In response to questions from the press, Sudomo affirmed that he had suggested that the term laborer be replaced by the word worker. Sudomo also said that he thought that a single organization would be more appropriate to present conditions than a federation.

"The political parties have fused; the professional organizations of workers should also be fused immediately," he said.

The minister said that a federation, the form now used for workers' organizations, is too complex and therefore is confusing. In addition, the workers' organizations are too bureaucratic and not flexible enough. Sudomo said that if they are preserved in their present form, it will be too hard for them to follow the course of national development.

In the new structure, the single workers' organization will have one central executive board with a general chairman, several chairmen, secretary generals and secretaries. In addition, the Central Executive Board (PP) of the Association of Employment Fields (SBLP) will be abolished and replaced by departments.

According to Sudomo the number of departments will be modeled on the structure of the ILO.

In that international labor organization there are only eight departments, each of which organizes workers in a particular sector. For example, the department of industry organizes workers in various industrial sectors.

Right now the FBSI has 21 SBLP. In addition, in the regional organizational structure there is an SBLP Branch Executive Board and an FBSI Provincial Executive Board.

In the organizational structure which Minister Sudomo wants there will no longer be

an SBLP Branch Executive Board. The FBSI Provincial Executive Board will be in direct contact with company executive boards.

A Swollen Elephant

Agus Sudono, general chairman of the DPP [Central Executive Board] of the FBSI, when asked for comments, said that personally he agreed with Minister Sudomo's ideas for simplifying FBSI's organization; however, he would prefer to channel them through the FBSI congress, to take place in October 1985.

If the congress agrees with those ideas, they will be put into effect. Agus Sudono said that the FBSI's bureaucracy is now so large and complex that it is like a swollen elephant--unable to move quickly.

When asked for his comments, Oetojo Osman, SH [master of laws], deputy head of the BP7 [Board for Training, Educating and Effectuating the Model for Inspiring and Implementing PANCASILA (Five Principles of the Nation)], who was once the director general for the Department of Labor's Bina Lindung [translation unknown] office and who had an important role in establishing the FBSI 12 years ago, said that he supported Sudomo's ideas.

He said that a unified workers' organization was wanted at that time, but that it was not possible to bring it about directly. If a single organization for workers' associations had been formed directly then, it would not have been considered democratic.

Azhar Achmad, chairman of FBSI's Legal Aid Society, said that if all such changes take place through a congress, they will not conflict with the organization's laws and bylaws.

9846

CSO:4213/179

INDONESIA

MINISTER SAYS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM BENEFITS IRIANESE

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2 Apr 85 p A8

[Text] Jakarta, April 2 (ANTARA).-- Minister of Transmigration Martono said the implementation of the government's transmigration program in Irian Jaya like in the other areas of the country, also covered the interests of the indigenous population.

Spokesman for the transmigration Ministry Hormat Meliala said here Tuesday that the minister made the statement to members of the Cendrawasih University recently when on a visit to Irian Jaya to hand a list of proposed projects for the region.

Martono explained that considering that the skills of the indigenous population were still lower than those of the transmigrants, some of the local population who will join a program of transmigrant allocation (APPDT), will be sent to Java for special training.

There are now about 60 of them being trained in special skills in various places on Java island, such as in Malang, Semarang, Yogyakarta and Bandung. Their acquired skills should not be inferior to those of transmigrants.

In this way upon their return to their places of origin they would be able to share their skills with the other members of the population making them capable of participation in development, particularly of Irian Jaya.

The minister also shared the view of the university members that the future transmigrants should be given special courses in Bahasa Indonesia to enable them to communicate better with the local population in Irian Jaya.

The minister admitted that many transmigrants who came from remote villages on Java island did not speak Indonesian very well, while the only means of communication with the local population would be Bahasa Indonesia.

Irian Jaya Governor Izaac Hindom also said that there were about 240 local dialects in the area so that it would be rather difficult to communicate with the local population unless Bahasa Indonesia is used.

Now most of the population of Irian Jaya have a reasonable command of Bahasa Indonesia so that the national language must be mastered by transmigrant. Governor Hindom also pointed out that the implementation of the transmigration program in Irian Jaya must be further stepped up because the region was in urgent need of people for its development.

The minister during the visit drew the conclusion that there were no meaningful problems in the implementation of the transmigration program in Irian Jaya.

The transmigrants that have been resettled in various places in Irian Jaya now total 17,800 families comprising about 74,350 persons. Merauke gets 4,839 families, Jayapura, 3,067, Paniae 1,459, Sorong 5,986 and Manokwari 2,449 families.

7 May 1985

INDONESIA

IRIANESE HAND OVER LAND FOR TRANSMIGRATION

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2 Apr 85 p A2

[Text]

Timika, April 1 (ANTARA).-- The people of the East Timika district, Fak-Fak regency, Irian Jaya, voluntarily surrendered their 40,000 hectares of land to the government to be used as a transmigration location.

The head of the transmigration department office in Fak-Fak regency, Abdul Muchid, said Saturday that the land which was handed over belonged to the Amungme tribe and the Kamoro tribe in the Kwamki and Wanita villages.

Sixteen prominent figures of the tribes represented their people in the handing over ceremony of the land. They stated that both tribes felt responsible to take part in the national development, especially in the development of the Timika regency, according to Abdul Muchid.

The opening of the transmigration area in the location has started in phases since in the 1984/1985 period, handled by PT Nusa Irian Jaya Indah.

In the first phase, a total of 1,200 hectares of land out of 40,000 hectares which are available was opened. In the 1985/86 budget, about 800 families are scheduled to be resettled out of the fixed 9,000 families during Pelita IV (the Five-Year Plan, 1984-1989).

Abdul Muchid said that the resettlement of the transmigrants in East Timika was the first implementation of the transmigration program in Fak-Fak regency.

CSO: 4200/791

INDONESIA

IRIANESE PROMISED SPECIAL ATTENTION IN TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1 Apr 85 p A 11

[Text]

Jayapura, March 31 (ANTARA).-- Minister of Transmigration Martono has affirmed that beginning this year, indigenous Irian Jayanese will receive the government's special care particularly in relations with the resettlement program in order to remove the existing social and psychological barriers.

In his lecture before students of the local Cenderawasih University, Saturday, he said this preference was not a new thing but a stepped-up effort over the previous politics in the course of consolidating the assimilation between the local people and the Javanese resettlers.

The minister added under the transmigration program, the number of local people in other provinces resettled in the transmigration areas ranged between 10 to 20 percent of the whole number of the transmigrants. But particularly in the Irian Jaya province, these figures reached 30 percent.

"Although it is high, in realization it turned out that the local Irian Jayanese still felt reluctant to be resettled because of a simple but basic problem, notably they felt hard to leave their original villages", the minister pointed out.

By these experiences and spurred by a strong drive to accelerate the process of skill-transfer and assimilation, the transmigration ministry eventually found out another alternative which is still in the scope of the transmigration mission, said Minister Martono.

The new alternative is a targeted 30 percent allocation for the local people in the resettlement areas, and the possibility of forming an insert program of transmigration in which the new settlers will be allocated in villages that are lacking in adequate population.

Minister Martono admitted that there are still many weaknesses in the transmigration programs but added that obviously the existence of the new settlers here will give a lot of advantages to the province, particularly in stepping up the agricultural production.

CSO: 4200/791

INDONESIA

OVER 100,000 FAMILIES RESETTLED IN FIRST YEAR OF PELITA IV

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1 Apr 85 p A1

[Text]

Jakarta, March 31 (ANTARA).-- The realization of the resettling of transmigrants from Java island during the first year of the fourth five year development plan (Pelita IV) has reached 100,622 families from the targeted 125,000 families.

According to the data available at the transmigration department Saturday, a number of 255 families were sent in four groups March 31, 1985 to the locations of Batulicin, South Kalimantan (54 families), Bajubang, Jambi (100 families), Kota Bangun, East Kalimantan (51 families), and Wendukumbe, Irian Jaya (50 families).

With this departure, the number of transmigrants until the end of March 1985 has increased to 100,922 families.

The data also indicated that the preparedness to transmigrate from Java had sharply increased.

The total number of transmigrant that has departed until now reached 445,817 persons.

CSO: 4200/791

INDONESIA

STEEL INDUSTRY TO BE ESTABLISHED IN YOGYAKARTA

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2 Apr 85 p A6

[Text]

Yogyakarta, April 1 (ANTARA).-- A large industrial complex that will process steel into processed goods will in the near future be established in Yogyakarta with raw materials of iron ore extracted from masses of sand richly available along the southern coast of the Kulonprogo Regency.

The processing of the iron-ore will be carried out by PT Aneka Tambang of Indonesia and two foreign companies namely Macky Deby Company of the United Kingdom and Lurgy Company of West Germany. Both of the private foreign companies will work under a consortium term.

The chairman of the Yogyakarta regional investment coordinating body, KMT Wirosepoetro told ANTARA here Monday that it was expected that the steel industry would stimulate the growth of various steel industries in the area.

It is also expected that an industry that could process quartz-sand richly available in that area to be made raw material of steel casting would be created in order to boost the lime-stone mining for the steel industry.

It is expected that the steel industry would produce about 78 million tons of concentrate each year.

If one ton of concentrate is processed and added with other material like vanadium and titanium, it could produce half a million tons of steel.

"Iron-sand of the world that contains vanadium and titanium could only be found in Central America and along the southern coast of the Kulonprogo Regency, Yogyakarta, Wirosepoetro said.

He added that vadium and titanium that will be produced in Kulonprogo could be exported to interested countries.

According to Wirosepoetro, the steel industry in Yogyakarta will produce about 550 thousand tons of steel each year.

CSO: 4200/791

INDONESIA

EAST KALIMANTAN TO BE COAL SUPPLIER FOR CEMENT PLANTS

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2 Apr 85 p A4

[Text]

Samarinda, April 2 (ANTARA).-- East Kalimantan with its natural richness in raw materials, particularly in the sectors of energy, mining and forestry has great potential to yield a wide range of industrial products, according to Minister of Industry Hartarto.

"In this framework, the government has arranged the province as a supplier of coal for energy necessities of cement plants in Java and South Sulawesi." the minister said Saturday in his lecture entitled "Patterns of National Industrial Developments" before some 200 big and small scale industrial entrepreneurs in the region.

The beneficial exploitation of natural and energy resources in the region is being continuously geared to the current fourth Five Year Plan. Accordingly, it must be accompanied by necessary steps to arrange the most appropriate space for industrial developments and in anticipation of any possible negative impacts, especially of the downstream area the minister pointed out.

"The space arrangement until the year 2000 must be well considered other use industrial development will be in jumble", he added, giving examples of the mixed industrial zones such as in Aceh of Bontang of East Kalimantan.

Development of small-scale industries

Concerning the small-scale industrial development, Minister Hartarto said that with attention and opportunity given by the big-scales to small-counterparts, the development will hopefully lead to equal opportunities for all.

"The development of a small scale industries is vital for absorbing a great deal of workers", he said.

In East Kalimantan, at present there are some 2,465 of small-scale industrial establishment with investments reaching Rp.15.68 billion and a workforces totalling 132,000.

CSO: 4200/791

INDONESIA

TRADE BALANCE WITH SINGAPORE IN PAST 5 YEARS

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2 Apr 85 pp A2, A3

[Text]

Jakarta, April 1 (ANTARA).-- The trade balance of Indonesia with Singapore during the last five years has always been in favour of Indonesia, except in 1983 which showed a deficit for Indonesia of US\$ 336.62 million.

Data, obtained by ANTARA from the ministry of trade Monday, showed that Indonesian exports to Singapore in 1979 stood at US\$ 1,964 million, while Indonesian imports from that country at 536.52 million US dollars, or a surplus for Indonesia of US\$ 1,427 million.

In 1982 Indonesian exports to Singapore recorded US\$ 3,121 million, while Indonesian imports reached a value of US\$ 2,819 million, or a surplus of US\$ 301.90 million in favour of Indonesia.

Indonesian exports to Singapore in 1983 increased to US\$ 3,128 million, but Indonesian imports from Singapore increased to US\$ 3,465 million, or a deficit of US\$ 336.62 million for Indonesia.

In the first ten months (January/October) of 1984 Indonesian exports to Singapore recorded a value of US\$ 1,682 million and Indonesian imports stood at US\$ 1,539 million, or a surplus for Indonesia of US\$ 142.58 million.

The trade relations between Indonesia and Singapore were based on the "Basic Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation" signed in Singapore in 1974.

The main export commodities from Indonesia to Singapore consist of crude oil and natural gas, and in the non-oil/non-gas sector of essential oils, shrimps, rubber, vegetables, cement, timber, textiles (including garments), cocoa, rattan and tin.

Import commodities from Singapore to Indonesia are products of oil processing, residue, ships, and various kinds of chemical ingredients as industrial raw material.

Indonesian commodities, whose exports can be intensified to the Singapore market are, according to the ministry of trade, rubber, sawn timber, fruits, traditional medical herbs, sea products and textile products.

Obstacles which occur in improving trade between the two countries, is the smuggling problem.

In the effort to overcome this problem, Indonesia has proposed to Singapore to carry out joint patrols and to revive discussions on the extradition problem.

CSO: 4200/791

7 May 1985

INDONESIA

STATE SHIPPING COMPANY PROFITABLE FOR FIRST TIME

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 22 Feb 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Commission V of the DPR-RI [Indonesian Parliament] considers that the directors of PELNI [Indonesian State Shipping], Inc. have succeeded in reviving that state-owned shipping company and have praised them because they have also increased its efficiency.

In a general hearing between Commission V of the DPR-RI and PELNI, Inc. held Thursday afternoon [21 February], it was revealed that the company is healthy for the first time in the 33 years of its existence. In fact, the company had a 1984 profit of 1.686 billion [rupiahs] before depreciation. In 1982, with an income of 53.416 billion rupiahs, expenses of 56.381 billion rupiahs and depreciation costs of 2.261 billion rupiahs, PELNI lost 2.295 billion rupiahs outside of depreciation.

Sudharno Mustafa, SH [master of laws], general director of PELNI, Inc., in response to questions from Commission V, said that in its entire history this was the first time that state accountants from the BPKP (Fiscal and Development Observation Board) had been able to give their opinion. They said that the facts presented in the 1983 fiscal report were true and in line with customary and consistently applied accounting principles.

Achieving financial health has been a very difficult struggle, especially because it involved laying off 3,772 out of 7,471 employees. "But those who were made to retire will keep on receiving their pensions; in fact, service work has been found for about 300 of them, for example, as cleaning personnel, shop managers on ships, etc.," said Sudharno.

Because of a rise in shipping productivity and tariffs, PELNI's income will increase and it will provide better service. Shipping productivity rose from 13.23 tons per dwt per year in 1982 to 14.96 tons per dwt per year in 1984. Tariffs rose from 13.842 rupiahs per ton in 1982 to 18.318 rupiahs in 1984.

Wages Rise 20 Percent

These increases and the addition next month of a new ship, the KM [motor ship] Umsini, will raise PELNI's income from last year's 64.683 million rupiahs to 75.339 million rupiahs this year. Expenses increased to 74.641 million rupiahs from last year's 62.997 million rupiahs, partly as a result of plans to raise employees' wages by an average 20 percent starting on 1 April.

Before PELNI's health was revived, the lowest wages paid were only 48,120 rupiahs and the highest 515,600 rupiahs [a month]. After the wage hike the lowest will be 105,320 rupiahs and the highest 657,100 rupiahs. In fact, with cargo and passenger bonuses for the crew a common sailor will be able to bring home 257,700 rupiahs and a ship's captain 1,543,500 rupiahs a month!

Now the only problem faced by PELNI is the size of the depreciation costs, particularly with the arrival of four new luxurious passenger ships. In 1982 the costs of depreciation were only 2.261 billion rupiahs; they rose to 6.562 billion rupiahs last year and rose again to 10.250 billion rupiahs this year.

On the average the decrease in the value of PELNI's new ships is 2.074 billion rupiahs for the KM Kerinci, the KM Kambun and the KM Rinjani; the depreciation costs of the KM Umsini, which will arrive in the country on 3 March, are budgeted at 1.901 billion rupiahs. This is considered a small amount because of a change in the estimated useful life from 20 to 25 years.

9846

CSO:4213/179

7 May 1985

INDONESIA

MP LAUDS WOLFOWITZ REMARKS ON EAST TIMOR

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 23 Feb 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The U.S. State Department's good evaluation of East Timor is an impetus for Indonesia to preserve that evaluation and, if possible, make it even better. Because as a superpower its evaluation is known throughout the world, the United States' good evaluation of East Timor is advantageous for Indonesia.

Rusli Desa, deputy chairman of Commission I of the DPR [Parliament], stated this in Jakarta yesterday, in connection with remarks made by Paul Wolfowitz, the Department of State's undersecretary for East Asian affairs. Wolfowitz said that in general the situation in East Timor is better now than it was last year and that the Indonesian government had increased its aid budget for that province.

Paul Wolfowitz's remarks were made on Wednesday [20 February] at a hearing of the subcommittee on Asia of the U.S. Congress.

Objective

Rusli said that the United States opinion was really objective because as a strong country it had many eyes and ears in Indonesia.

"If it were a case of a country that hadn't understood the situation yet, it might be because it was dictated by another country or because a difference in ideology made it not wish to understand the situation," said Rusli. Rusli added that we could just ignore another country's views, but nevertheless close international ties do exist.

Rusli said that development in East Timor must really be handled well and not break down. "Successful development will wake up the trouble-makers and turn them around," said Rusli.

Rusli suggested that officials in East Timor be serious and not offend the local people there. Rusli also suggested that attention be paid to spiritual development such as instilling nationalist feelings and a love of country.

41.5 Billion Rupiahs

Quoting ABRI [Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces] leaders, Rusli said that for 1985-1986 41.5 billion rupiahs has been made available for the security and welfare of

the Armed Forces serving in East Timor, compared to 22.5 billion rupiahs in 1984-1985. Rusli said that this is needed mainly to overcome the trouble-makers who keep on obstructing development there as well as for existing means of persuasion.

Rusli said that the tight restrictions on permits for people who wanted to go to East Timor were for their own safety. "If something happens to them, we will be blamed; foreigners always look for places where there are problems," Rusli added.

More Aggressive

Rusli pressed foreign affairs officers to be more aggressive, dynamic and persuasive, especially towards African countries which do not yet understand about East Timor. The statement made by the United States will certainly help, but it would be better if we were the ones to make the approaches, Rusli said. Although the East Timor question is no longer on the UN agenda, Rusli said, there must continue to be attempts to persuade those countries. Rusli said that there would be opportunities to persuade and convince them at the upcoming commemoration of the Asia-Africa conference.

Rusli also hopes that approaches will be directed towards the countries of the South Pacific region.

9846
CSO:4213/179

7 May 1985

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

SAUDI AID MADE PUBLIC--H Amin Iskandar, member of Parliament and the People's Consultative Assembly, said that the special character of the aid that Ambassador Sheik Muhammad Said Bashrawie is conveying to Indonesia's Islamic community should be known to the public and witnessed by the masses. This is not merely so that the masses know about it; the Saudi government means it to be proof of its intentions. He made this statement in his opening remarks at a ceremony handing over Saudi aid to the Al-Awwabin School on Raya Sawangan Street, Sengon, Pancoran, city of Depok. He went on to say that in this way it will be clear that Saudi aid is not used for explosions, such as those that took place in Tanjung Priok and Borobudur. When this becomes known to the public, Saudi aid will also serve as a kind of control, both for the Indonesian government and for those who have given the aid. This will be done without interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs and also in accordance with the Indonesian government's goals of furthering religious life. Ambassador Said Bashrawie is very happy to see President Soeharto paying attention to expanding religious life in Indonesia and so his country is not reluctant to give aid, said H Amin Iskandar, making his statement as the religious school's advisor. [Text] [Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 28 Feb 85 pp 1, 6] 9846

CSO: 4213/179

LAOS

PASASON COMMENTS ON NORTHEASTERN THAI'S STRUGGLE

BK191434 Vientiane KPL in English 0937 GMT 19 Apr 85

[Text] Vientiane, 19 April (KPL)--The daily PASASON, in an article today, attributes the miserable life and poverty of the northeastern Thai population (ISAN) to the social exploitation and oppression by the Bangkok ultra-reactionary circles.

It says that more than 17 million northeastern Thai people are living in abject poverty. The disparity in the annual incomes of the northeastern Thais and those who live in Bangkok is four times. The northeastern people are denied their basic rights, including their children's right to education.

The paper continues, although the Thai ruling circles have often pledged to guarantee the equality and interests of all people of different social strata, the northeastern people continue to be maltreated. Thousands of "Isan" people have fled their locality in hopes of finding a "better life" in Bangkok. But in fact, many of them have fallen victim to unemployment, starvation, prostitution, social oppression.

The annual unemployment rate in Thailand accounts for 10.2 percent of the total workforce. Unemployment also hits many of the 400,000 university-graduates. Therefore, most of these graduates have to accept any kind of work for low wages in order to survive.

Another concrete evidence of the Thai ruling circles' oppression of the northeastern Thai people is their strong opposition to the recent "Northeastern People's Day" organized by them to strengthen their solidarity and safeguard their good tradition. This has further urged the northeastern people in Thailand to unite together in their struggle the removal of the exploiting yoke, and for social equality. [Sentence, punctuation as received]

Though being strongly opposed and persecuted, the northeastern people--including their 2 million relatives working in hard conditions in Bangkok--will go on with their struggle," said Ani Phisaphan, secretary of the "Isan Day" organizing board. [Quotation mark and name as received.]

Realities have proved that no matter what method of oppression used by the Thai ruling circles, they can never force the northeastern Thai people to forget about the sound of their Khaen, "a musical instrument," which symbolized their tradition, the paper concludes.

CSO: 4200/838

7 May 1985

LAOS

BRIEFS

④ CONSTITUTION DRAFTING MEETING--Vientiane, 20 April (OANA-KPL)--A conference reviewing the drafting of the national constitution and electoral law was held here on 18 April by the Constitutional Drafting Committee. It was attended by Souphanouvong, president of the republic, the People's Supreme Assembly, and the Constitutional Drafting Committee, and other officials concerned. The participants studied a report on political, economic, cultural and social data collected by a sub-committee for constitutional drafting from answers to questionnaires recently distributed by it. They shared the view that these data were of great significance in providing basic reference for the compilation of the draft of the first national constitutional and electoral law. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0858 GMT 21 Apr 85 BK]

LENIN PHOTO EXHIBITION--Vientiane, 20 April (KPL)--A photo exhibition in honour of the 115th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday and the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism was opened here yesterday by the Lao Committee for Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Victory over Hitlerite Fascism in conjunction with the Lenin Central Museum, the Lao-Soviet Friendship Association and the Ministry of Culture. Present at the opening ceremony were Phoumi Vongvichit, Political Bureau member of the LPRP CC, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, president of the Lao Committee for Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Victory over Hitlerite Fascism, and other senior officials. Diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organizations in Laos were also present. On this occasion, Pheli Khounlaleuk, deputy-minister of culture, and Vladimir Sobchenko, Soviet ambassador to Laos, highlighted the solidarity, friendship, and all-round cooperation between Laos and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and peaceloving people in the world. They also stressed on the need to promote the struggle against the arms-race for peace and security in Southeast Asia and in the world as a whole, and for the great triumph of Marxism-Leninism, socialism and communism. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0902 GMT 20 Apr 85 BK]

VONGVICHIT MEETS WAR VETERANS--Vientiane, 18 April (KPL)--Phoumi Vongvichit, Political Bureau member of the LPRP CC, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, received here yesterday a visiting delegation of the Ministry of War Veterans and Social Welfare of Kampuchea led by its deputy-minister Duong Chum. During the warm and cordial talk, the two sides exchanged views on how to help war victims and to improve the living standard of the people in both countries. They also discussed the regional situation, especially the tension along the

borders between Laos and Thailand and between Kampuchea and Thailand. Phoumi Vongvichit and Duong Chum reaffirmed the great friendship, special militant solidarity and all-round cooperation between the parties and the peoples of the two countries as well as among Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam. The Kampuchean delegation arrived here on 13 April. It was met at Wattai Airport by Boungnang Sakounsouk, deputy-president of the Lao State Committee for War Veterans and Social Welfare. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0901 GMT 18 Apr 85 BK]

SRV DELEGATION MEETS SOUPHANOUVONG--Vientiane, 23 April (KPL)--President Souphanouvong received here yesterday a visiting delegation of the mass mobilization committee of the CPV led by its President Tran Quoc Hoan, member of the CPV CC. During the warm and cordial talk, President Souphanouvong welcomed the delegation's visit to Laos. The two sides discussed the front and mass mobilization work in their respective countries and their mutual help in this field for the benefits of the special solidarity and all-round cooperation between the parties, governments and peoples of the two countries. The Vietnamese delegation left here in the afternoon of the same day. It was farwelled at Wattai airport by Ounheuan Phounsavat, vice-president of the mass mobilizing and front committee of LPRP, and other senior officials. Nguyen Xuan, Vietnamese ambassador to Laos, was also present. The Vietnamese delegation arrived here on 13 April at the invitation of the mass mobilizing and front committee of the LPRP. During its stay here the delegation had talks with the mass mobilizing and front committee of the LPRP and other mass organizations of the central level and of Vientiane. The delegation also toured various construction and cultural bases. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0856 GMT 23 Apr 85 BK]

HUNGARIAN TV GROUP MEETS LOVANSAI--Vientiane, 19 April (KPL)--A delegation of the Hungarian TV Committee led by Mihaly Kornidesz, member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party CC, left here yesterday after a 5-day visit to Laos. During its stay here, the delegation called on Sisomphon Lovansai, Political Bureau member of the LPRP CC, vice-president of the People's Supreme Assembly, and also in charge of the organization, propaganda and training work of the party CC. It signed with a Lao delegation a memorandum on television cooperation and visited a number of production bases and historical sites. Bidding farewell to the Hungarian guest at the airport here were Son Khamvanvongsa, chairman of the State Committee for News Agency, Newspaper, Radio and TV and Rosta Laszlo, Hungarian ambassador to Laos. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0934 GMT 19 Apr 85 BK]

LPRP DELEGATION LEAVES FOR HANOI--Vientiane, 20 April (KPL)--A delegation of the Propaganda and Training Board of the LPRP Central Committee led by its deputy-head Khamma Phomkong left here on 18 April for Vietnam to attend a seminar scheduled to be held in Hanoi soon. The delegation was invited by the Propaganda and Training Board of the CPV Central Committee. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0856 GMT 20 Apr 85 BK]

CSO: 4200/838

MALAYSIA

KUALA LUMPUR SAYS SRV CAN EMERGE FROM ISOLATION

BK171139 Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The Australian foreign minister, Mr Bill Hayden, has expressed the view that Vietnam should not be isolated as that would only increase its dependence on the Soviet Union. It is entirely up to each sovereign nation to decide for itself its external relations and its development of contacts with a community of nations.

Ten years ago, after the fall of Saigon and the reunification of the country under one government, there was much goodwill and sympathy for Vietnam. The world over, peoples and governments, irrespective of their political ideologies, welcomed the success of the Vietnamese. Very few really sympathized with the Americans who left Vietnam after more than 10 years of futile as well as wasteful war.

The international community, including ASEAN, felt that the Vietnamese leaders would embark on a serious program of economic reconstruction so that their war-weary citizens will cultivate the arts of peace. Unfortunately, the past 10 years have been the evolution of an entirely different Vietnam. Many thousands of its people have welcomed the opportunity to leave the country even though it meant taking the risk of drifting in small boats in the South China Sea at the mercy of pirates as well as natural maritime hazards. After the invasion of Kampuchea, in the guise of fighting an oppressive regime, the Vietnamese give the impression of wanting to hold on to that country indefinitely. At the same time, ties with Soviet Union have grown so strong that it is obvious Vietnam would not be able to further its military policies in Kampuchea without the daily U.S. \$5 million that the Russians are estimated to be providing as aid. Under the circumstances, if Vietnam is isolated, then it is something that it has brought upon itself.

The various countries of Southeast Asia have not, in any way, treated Vietnam in any objectionable manner. They willingly established diplomatic and trade links and looked forward to turning Southeast Asia into a zone of genuine peace, freedom, and neutrality. Vietnam has frustrated that policy. It has allowed the Soviet Union to use Cam Ranh Bay as a major naval base. ASEAN and other states of this region regard this strong Russian presence with serious

misgivings. It is because of Vietnam's subservience to the Soviet Union that from time to time views are heard advocating greater involvement in Southeast Asia security by China, the U.S.A., and other powers. Vietnam has preferred to put its trust in a far away superpower rather than to get to know its own neighbors. However much it may celebrate the 10th anniversary of the taking of Saigon and the launching of its new order, it cannot obliterate from the consciousness of the millions of people its continued occupation of Kampuchea and the denial to the people of that country the right to deciding their own system of government. Vietnam can emerge from its self-imposed isolation if it wants to.

CSO: 4200/835

MALAYSIA

KUALA LUMPUR COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH PRC

BK181325 Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0800 GMT 18 Apr 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The Malaysian deputy foreign minister, Mr Abdul Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, had confirmed that the Malaysian prime minister is likely to visit the People's Republic of China some time in November this year. This will be an important landmark in Malaysia's relations with China. The Malaysian prime minister has always adopted the practice of paying personal visits to friendly nations and holding direct talks and negotiations on trade and cultural relations. In that way Malaysia has built up a veritable web of cordial ties with numerous members of the family of nations.

The present visit of the Malaysian prime minister to Austria and four Nordic countries is excellent evidence of that policy. In the case of the People's Republic of China it is, of course, too large a country to be ignored. It is now fully committed to the laudable goals of the four modernizations. A China bent on internal economic progress is a much better nation to deal with than the former country which was caught up in the inward-looking policies of a cultural revolution. Malaysia has always sought to encourage trade between the two countries. In fact, the volume of goods and services exchanged by the two countries is very much in favor of Beijing. Malaysia would like China to buy more from us, and no doubt all aspects of trade between the two nations will be fully studied and new proposals will be noted for increasing the volume of their trade.

In connection with Malaysia's relations with China, it is interesting to note that an interministerial committee was set up last year to deal with the general question of how to increase Malaysian-Chinese trade without jeopardizing Malaysia's security and national unity. The real stumbling block is a rather strange and out-of-date policy that Beijing is holding on to by continuing to give moral support for the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya. China's leaders and more particularly Mr Yaobang, the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party have been going to different countries in the Asia-Pacific region talking of goodwill and peaceful coexistence.

Malaysia, while warmly welcoming the kind of sentiment, would like to see it translated into reality. In this connection, the views of the Indonesian

foreign minister, Professor Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, are also relevant. He has always reiterated his country's stand that normalization cannot take place until China renounces its backing of communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has yet to reestablish the diplomatic ties with China that were broken in 1967. The People's Republic of China has had several diplomatic successes in recent months in its relations with the Western powers but it should not treat Southeast Asian nations as any the less in importance.

China must give up its vestigial support for the local communists as otherwise deep distrust or caution will continue to be the attitude of nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, and so on. The Malaysian prime minister's visit, hopefully, may be a new and brighter chapter in relations with China.

CSO: 4200/835

MALAYSIA

PAPER SAYS INDONESIA NOT AT ODDS WITH ASEAN ON SRV

BK221329 Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 20 Apr 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Murdani Knows Best?"]

[Text] For the second time in barely over a year, Indonesia has caused a flurry of concern to ripple through ASEAN with a position on Vietnam that appears to be at odds with the stated ASEAN policy on Kampuchea. Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General Benni Murdani has again ruffled regional sentiments, this time with his bald statement to the effect that he believes Hanoi's claimed troop withdrawals are genuine and not, as past experience has shown a continuance of troop rotations masquerading as pullbacks. In February last year, Gen. Murdani epilogued his visit to Hanoi with a proclamation that "the Indonesian Army and people" did not believe that Vietnam posed a danger to South-East Asia. Then, as now, his words caused deep consternation amongst Indonesia's ASEAN partners, particularly--and hardly surprisingly--Thailand; which had and still has good cause to regard the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea as a most threatening presence indeed.

With yet another Indonesian statement which seems in conflict with ASEAN's defined stand on Kampuchea, it now appears imperative that the essential principles underlying that stand be re-emphasised, before any talk of the erosion of ASEAN unity gets out of hand. There are but two principles which ASEAN holds inviolate in its policy on Kampuchea. First, that Vietnam remove its occupation forces in their entirety. Second, that Kampuchea be returned its right to self-determination. Based on these cardinal principles, nothing Indonesia has said or done is in opposition to the overall ASEAN position on Kampuchea.

It is painfully obvious, however, that the ASEAN six are hardly unanimous on the best tactics to adopt in pursuit of these agreed objectives. It is important, then, to remember that although ASEAN is regarded as the cornerstone of all six members' foreign policies, each nation continues to reserve the right to retain its own perspectives on the issues which confront the region. Indonesia is set apart from the rest of ASEAN in its approach to bilateral relations with Vietnam; it is the only ASEAN nation to have maintained contact with Vietnam over regional security and defence. Indonesia has cultivated relations with Hanoi on a far more intimate level than any of its ASEAN partners, and this must perforce manifest itself in the Indonesian perspective on Kampuchea.

MALAYSIA

COMMENTARY ON SIGNIFICANCE OF BANDUNG CONFERENCE

BK231341 Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0800 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Thirty years ago this week, the first intercontinental conference of African and 23 Asian nations took place in Bandung, Indonesia. During the next few days, much will be said about the significance and relevance of the Bandung conference to the Third World nations in our very own day and age.

Bandung was an important landmark in world affairs because it represented the first affirmation of an international policy to a certain extent against the European and American powers of the Afro-Asian nations. At the time, world politics was dominated by Western Europe and North America; large parts of Africa and Asia were still under European colonial rule. In fact, after black African states or (?even) Ghan attended the conference and it, too, had not yet achieved independence.

The strong nationalist sentiments that were much in evidence at Bandung gave tremendous moral support to all the nationalist leaders of Africa and Asia who were struggling for independence. Exactly 5 years after the Bandung conference--that is, in 1960--most French colonies in Africa gained independence. The wind of political change put a rapid end to colonialism in Asia, Africa, the Philippines, and the South Pacific.

It was at the Bandung conference that the Afro-Asian bloc was informally established which in later years evolved into the present Nonaligned Movement. It was at Bandung that the late Jawaharlal Nehru, Marshal Tito, and President Nasir articulated the need for active neutrality as a firm policy for the new emergent states. In spite of some differences among the pro-Western, commu-K nist and neutralist blocs, there were unanimity towards self-determination, economic, and cultural cooperation as well as opposition to colonialism. From then on, there was a keen desire on the part of the Asian-African and Arab nations to get to know one another better and to win for themselves a more meaningful role in international affairs.

Today, the aims and achievements of the men who gathered at Bandung 30 years ago are still a source of inspiration. The leaders who were in Bandung in 1955 are no more except for the Philippine elder statesman, Carlos Romulo, and Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk of Kampuchea.

Vestigal problems of colonialism still exist in some parts of the world. In the South Pacific, the French are stubbornly refusing to recognize the reality of Kanak nationalism, just as 30 years ago they preferred to fight Algerian nationalism. In southern Africa, people of Namibia are still under the yoke of a white racist regime. In spite of political independence, many nations are striving for true economic independence by building up greater economic viability and lessing the dependence on multinational cooperations.

On the more positive side, successful regional entities like ASEAN and the Pacific Forum have come into existence. Malaysia was under colonial rule but moving towards international or internal self-rule at the time of the 1955 Bandung conference. Today, it participates fully in regional and international affairs, and still believes in the letter and the spirit of the Bandung principles formulated in April 1955.

CSO: 4200/835

MALAYSIA

BRIEFS

USSR, SRV ROLE IN CAMBODIA--The seventh DAP [Democratic Action Party] National Congress has passed several resolutions, including one that condemns Vietnam for its recent violation of Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. The resolution also calls on Vietnam to pull out its troops from Kampuchea and end the Vietnamese occupation of colonization of the country in respect of the right of self-determination by the Kampuchean people. It also calls on the Soviet Union to stop using Vietnam and Afghanistan as proxies to further its military expansionist designs in the Asia-Pacific region. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service in English 1330 GMT 20 Apr 85]

AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE AID--The Australian Air Force is to continue to station personnel and aircraft even after the Malaysian Air Force takes over its Butterworth Air Base in the northwest state of Penang in mid-1988. Australia's deputy air force chief, Air Vice Marshal Newham, said the Australian Government would continue to assist Malaysia in air force training since Australia had a defense agreement with Malaysia. Speaking to journalists after calling on the acting chief minister of Penang State, Datuk Khor Gark Kim, Air Vice Marshal Newham said the present 1,000 Australian personnel at Butterworth Air Base would be reduced to 200 by 1988. He said the Mirage aircraft squadron would also be withdrawn from the base during this period. [Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 21 Apr 85]

CSO: 4200/835

PHILIPPINES

IMF RESERVE MONEY TARGET EXCEEDED BY 800 MILLION PESOS

HK191435 Manila BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Rigoberto D. Tiglao]

[Text] The Philippines exceeded the end-March reserve money ceiling of P [pesos] 31 billion imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by only P800 million, according to a high-ranking Central Bank [CB] official.

The official claimed that the excess of only P800 million would convince the IMF management that the country "substantially" complied with the end-March ceiling on the reserve money level. This is especially so, he noted, in view of the country's inflation rate gradually going down and with the general credit situation in the country remaining tight. The IMF imposed a ceiling on the expansion of reserve money basically since this represents the new money being created by the CB which ultimately determines the overall credit situation. The IMF and the CB had also agreed on using the reserve money level as a performance criterion since data on the reserve money level are determined earlier by the CB compared to data on narrow money supply or total domestic liquidity.

The official, however, cautioned that the P31.8-billion end-March reserve money level--calculated as the average of the five business days before March 31 and the five business days after--is still a preliminary figure. He explained that the CB had stopped publicly releasing the reserve money level on a daily basis since these data actually are tentative and are only estimates. The CB still has to double check the data from the national Treasury and the banks and reconcile them.

However, BUSINESS DAY sources in the CB claimed that the overshooting of the P31-billion ceiling was not the major point the IMF management argued with the government about. Rather it was the means by which the CB managed to bring down the [?] level--on a weekly average basis--from P33.1 billion in the second week of March to P32.7 billion the following week and to P30.9 billion in the last five business days before March 31.

Instead of escalating its sales of CB and Treasury bills by raising the yields on these government IOU's, the CB resorted to extremely short-term measures to mop up liquidity. These measures consisted largely of reverse repurchase

agreements and other forms of short-term direct borrowings from banks. The short-term maturities of such CB borrowings--the bulk of which represented the CB's 'holding of banks' cash for only a week--meant that liquidity would almost immediately go up again after the IMF-set deadline.

However, sources said the government had a very strong argument for resorting to such measures and even for slightly exceeding the IMF-set ceiling. The CB's continued tight monetary policies had contributed to the conditions that had pushed about five banks to financial difficulties. The CB, as the argument went, had no option but to extend emergency help to these financial institutions, which consequently pushed up the reserve money level above the IMF indicative target.

However, there was apparently a more basic disagreement over monetary policy between the IMF management and the CB. The government, including the CB, had wanted a looser monetary policy, that would translate into a dip in interest rates, so as to prompt some growth in the country's gross national product (GNP). The country's monetary and economic authorities had been very apprehensive over the 6 percent decline in GNP last year since this decline would result in increasing poverty that would risk social unrest.

The CB attempt to loosen up its monetary policy was reflected in the yields it offered, for example, on the T-bills. The CB had gradually decreased rates on the T-bills (the 35-day bills) from a peak of 40 percent late last year to a low of 26.2 percent in the last week of January. After being cautioned by the IMF, however, that the loosening of monetary policy is still untimely, the CB increased the rates again to the current 32.5 percent. The CB's difficulty in bringing down the reserve money level before the IMF deadline had been partly due to the fact that it had slightly loosened up its monetary policy during the first two months of the year.

CSO: 4200/830

7 May 1985

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL CRITICIZES DETERIORATING SITUATION

HK221402 Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 11 Apr 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Blood Spilling Goes On"]

[Text] The killing of Filipinos by brother Filipinos goes on with unabated and increasing regularity. From Cagayan in the north to Mindanao in the south, blood continues to spill out in an unending carnage that appears to have no end in sight.

Never before has there been so much fighting in our country among our own people. Are we now in a state of civil war? Is there no solution to this incessant blood-letting, this continuing destruction of life and property which saps our national strength and from which no one will gain?

Before the dictatorship took the country over, it was not like this. The insurgency was there, but it was confined to small pockets in Central Luzon, Metro Manila and southern Luzon.

Now, the rebellion has blossomed out throughout the entire country. The NPA's appear to have secured strong footholds in all regions. There were no insurgents in Mindanao before 1972, but today, the former Land of Promise has been turned into a battle field a no man's land--where nobody feels secure. In Zamboanga City, Davao City, Iligan City, Cotabato City, people go out at night at their peril.

What gives one a sick feeling in the stomach is that the situation is deteriorating. One cannot help but realize that things will get worse before they can get better.

We do not, of course, believe that communism will prevail in this land where 80 percent of the population are Christians and, therefore, can never subscribe to the communist ideology.

If the insurgents today appear to be gaining, it is only because the government is losing ground. And the government is losing ground because it does not anymore inspire the confidence, the trust and the loyalty of the people.

Our only hope, therefore, is to find the political solution to the political problem into which all this mess has been compounded.

The political solution is simple and is attainable--change the government which brought about all these problems and effect the return of justice, freedom and democracy.

Then peace will return to our country.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL ON VISIT OF U.S. OFFICIALS TO MANILA

HK221446 Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 14 Apr 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Message to Marcos"]

[Text] The latest statements from two visiting United States officials on the sorry state of this so-called Republic must have been an extremely jolting experience for President Marcos, his wife Imelda, and his other cohorts in the administration.

Mincing no words--probably because they are cognizant of the couple's penchant for twisting words to suit their purpose--U.S. Senator John Kerry of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Peter McPherson, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), spelled out the American position with clarity to avoid any possible misinterpretation.

Both expressed their government's strong feeling for the restoration of the democratic process in this country through the institution of political reforms, greater military professional reforms, and economic restructuring. And as if to impress upon Mr. Marcos that the U.S. Government is serious this time, Kerry and McPherson mentioned certain leverages that their government would be prepared to apply should their recommendations not be heeded.

Although couched in subtle and diplomatic language, they left no room for doubt that a significant response will be forthcoming from the U.S. should the Marcos regime persist in continuing with its erring ways.

There is a strong possibility, if not an outright certainty, that the statements of these two high-echelon American officials reflect the new policy of the Reagan administration. This means that Marcos faces the high probability of losing his staunchest ally and benefactor and the military and economic aid that has been the underpinning of this hated regime for the last score of years.

The Filipino people may not be expecting it since they have been frustrated and disappointed so often in the past but these developments could indicate that their deliverance is soon forthcoming.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

FORMER ASSEMBLYMAN ON PLANS FOR AQUINO CASE DEMONSTRATIONS

HK221539 Manila TIMES JOURNAL in English 22 Apr 85 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] A former assemblyman claimed yesterday that a group of students, laborers, and "activist" nuns and priests is planning to conduct demonstration at the Sandiganbayan premises to "force the hand of the justices to convict those accused in the Aquino-Galman case."

Antonio R. Tupaz, former Agusan del Norte assemblyman, said the group is now undergoing a series of intensive lectures on "tactics and strategy" on how to conduct such rallies.

He cited "reliable sources" as the source of his information.

He said the sources told him that the training was being conducted by some "American-looking men," but that there were "strong indications" that the mass action experts are from left-leaning Latin American countries.

"There secret training is being conducted in a big Makati office building under the auspices of prominent opposition leaders and confirmed professional Marcos-haters," said Tupaz, quoting his sources.

He said the initial batch of trainees were to complete their "schooling" yesterday and are expected to conduct their respective teach-ins in various parts of Metro Manila to train at least a 1,000-strong core group of professional rabble rousers.

Tupaz claimed the first batch hatched its plan to use the studentry and labor for a series of demonstrations and rallies at the Sandiganbayan "as a model for future plans to disrupt government services and create a siege atmosphere."

"This communist-inspired group will be sowing on fertile ground if it should penetrate the ranks of Sandiganbayan hecklers and demonstrators, for these are peopled by professional Marcos-haters and rabble rousers," Tupaz said.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL ON U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS AT AQUINO TRIAL

HK230953 Quezon City VERITAS in English 14 Apr 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Watching Which Way the Political Wind Blows"]

[Text] Frankly, all the hullabaloo about American Embassy officials being present during the Agrava Board hearings, listening to the tapes or viewing the photo-chronology prepared by the legal panel, leaves us cold.

What is there to get excited about?

The traditional role of embassies is to gather information about the host country. Military attaches gather military intelligence, labor and economic attaches amass data about the country's labor and economic situations, respectively.

And, it goes without saying, political officers accumulate political information. The fact-finding board hearings, it goes without saying also, provided a sensitive gauge to determine which way the political wind was blowing. So what was more natural than for political officers to be around?

Surely, we cannot be so naive as to believe that embassies are set up in the Philippines just so their personnel can stand around at cocktail parties engaging in small talks and looking very diplomatic.

Embassy officials are assigned to a particular country to find out as much as they can about that country. The members of the Philippine diplomatic corps are doing exactly the same thing in their respective assignments abroad. If they have not been complained against, it may be because their host countries have a more realistic view of the functions and duties of embassy personnel. Or--terrible thought!--it may be because they are not doing what the people of the Philippines are paying them good money to do.

The American Embassy officials who observed the board hearings did so because they were allowed to go in. Surely, they did not force their way in. So, what's all the fuss about?

And if those officials--and the officials of other embassies here--decide to watch the ongoing Sandiganbayan trial, they have a right to do so. The trial is supposed to be open to the public. The rules do not say it is open only to Filipino citizens.

CSO: 4200/831

PHILIPPINES

PRINCIPALS, ANALYSTS RESPOND ON POST-MARCOS VIEWS

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 9 Mar 85 p 6

["Turning Point" column by Benjamin Salvosa: "Schism in the System"]

[Text]

DEATH WATCHERS - provoked a storm of denunciation for their jokes about the health of the President. It was reminiscent of the controversial statement of Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado who was quoted the terminally ill "have a duty to die and get out of the way."

So the President disclosed he had fully recovered from virus and asthma attacks which required his being placed in an oxygen tent.

"No matter what we say, all these self-serving statements would not help dissipate the cloud of doubt cast by some of our critics."

On March 7, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported he was given less-than-clean bill of health from an outside source - a doctor travelling with a Japanese trade mission organized by Keidanren, the federation of Japanese industrial groups. "When the mission called at the palace on 12 February, the doctor said that Marcos definitely looked worse than when he had met the President five years earlier. The Keidanren mission, which also visited other Asean capitals, had even worse news for its hosts-it said that Japanese business community was not prepared to make any further investments in the Philippines for the time being."

Earlier, *Newsweek* asked Jose W. Diokno what he sees as the worst and best scenarios if the President is incapacitated. He replied the worst scenario would be a military government from the group of General Ver, because it would have absolutely no constitutional basis whatsoever. The best scenario would be an acceptance by the people of a transitional government that would include all the elements of the opposition and some of the decent members of Marcos' party. That would allow us to clean up right away, start on a new constitution, eliminate authoritarian provisions, give the people hope that there would be some political stability and a common effort at reconstructing society. In two or three years, we would begin to see a better standard of living for most Filipinos.

Q: Do you think there will be a presidential election?

A: It would depend. If these two powerful groups cannot come to an agreement among themselves, the chances are that there is going to be a military government. That government could well be one led by (acting chief of staff) Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos or someone in his faction. Or it could be someone from the Ver faction whose intent

would probably be to postpone elections, perhaps for some time, in order to consolidate their power.

But Salvador Laurel thinks the presidential election will be held this year. "Based on two things: the health of Marcos and the activities and behavior of Imelda. Those two convinced me that there will be an election in 1985 despite the denials."

POLITICAL VACUUM

GIVEN the existence of a powerful entrenched military, what is the future of a civilian rule in the country? Not very promising, answers University of the Philippines professor Carolina Hernandez.

In the light of the prevailing political crisis, Hernandez does not see the military returning to the barracks. Where the current succession mechanism remains inadequate, a return to the barracks is not likely in the event of a vacancy occurring in the presidency between now and 1987. She thinks the military would find it difficult to resist a political vacuum as events in other Third World countries have demonstrated.

The sign she might be right was when General Ver told Foreign Correspondents Club (FOCAP), it was on October 24 that President Marcos, Acting Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos, commanding officers of the AFP's major services and the Regional Unified Command agreed to reinstate Gen. Fabian Ver as AFP Chief of Staff if acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.

Ver also denied the reported rift between him and Gen. Ramos, saying "we are very close" and the running feud with Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, explaining "we've worked together. . . he is the godfather of my son Irwin." Irwin, an honor graduate of PMA, is a colonel assigned to the Presidential Security Command, according to the *Philippine Inquirer*.

He also said that, as agreed upon in that October 24 meeting, his alleged co-accessory, METROCOM chief on leave Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas, will also be reinstated if acquitted.

There was no agreement on the fate of AVSECOM chief Brig. Gen. Luther Custodio and Presidential Security Command Liaison Officer Col. Vicente Tigas, and 22 other military men named as principals by the Tanodbayan.

MILITARISM

THE UNITED States might support a military government here if it sees this as the only alternative to a leftist takeover, said Aquilino Pimentel after his trip to Washington.

A military government could be installed despite strong objections from the State Department and the Pentagon once the political opposition fails to organize an alternative government in a post-Marcos era.

Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, acting Armed Forces chief, is the possible leader of a coup d'etat. Ramos, educated in West Point, appears more acceptable to the US than AFP chief on leave Gen. Fabian C. Ver.

Ramos will lead the takeover.

He was trained in West Point like former strongman Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua. Somoza was ousted by Sandinista guerillas in 1979 after years of authoritarian rule in that volatile Latin American country.

Ramos is in a position to lead a takeover despite popular knowledge that Ver has the loyalty of top-ranking military officers. Once Ramos initiates the military takeover, all the other officials will fall in line.

Ramos is now consolidating power in the armed forces.

Earlier, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* reported:

Since assuming acting command of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Ramos has heartened the Manila business community. Business leaders once feared a military-assisted power grab by close friends of ailing President Marcos, but Lt. Gen. Ramos has declared that the armed forces won't condone such a takeover.

Indeed, he seems to be doing well enough with only local support. Influential Manilans thought he was unfairly passed over when President Marcos named Gen. Ver chief of staff in 1981. There was a bit of snobbery in the Manilans' attitude. Lt. Gen. Ramos, the son of a former foreign affairs secretary and a cousin of the president's, had the right career experience for the post. Gen. Ver, who came from the same province as President Marcos, was of much humbler beginnings and rose from the ranks through years of personal service to the president.

Gen. Ver had been receiving the brunt of public hostility toward the bloated military. "People don't like me because I was also chief of intelligence and shrouded in mystery," Gen. Ver says. Lt. Gen. Ramos almost powerless as deputy chief of staff was relatively free of any taint of corruption.

INTERVENTIONISM

THE Philippine Support Committee (PSC), a research firm based in Washington, D.C., reports:

The mere presence of the Luzon bases makes direct US intervention relatively easy logistically.

Direct intervention, should it occur, would likely begin with incremental steps, but with the position of the US bases, it could escalate rapidly.

Given the Reagan administration's propensity for gunboats over diplomacy, military intervention will increase as the strength of the Opposition movement continues to build.

For the past year, the US congress and administration have been waging activities meant to contain the Philippine political crisis triggered by the 1983 assassination of Opposition Leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.

For the past four months, top-level representatives from the State Department, the Pentagon, Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other US intelligence agencies have been meeting bi-weekly to formulate US response to the Philippine opposition movement - both the moderates and the armed dissidents.

Last year, House Democrats reportedly called hearings to determine how to pull the rug from under the estimated 10,000 to 15,000 armed guerillas in the Philippine countryside.

The US policy entered a new phase and focused attention on the countryside after Washington was jolted by alarming reports on the growth of the New People's Army (NPA).

Recently US Secretary of State George Shultz said the American government strongly and categorically supports President Marcos and will continue to extend economic and military aid to the Philippines.

"We support the professionalization of its armed forces and we have confidence in the measures being taken by the Marcos administration against the insurgents."

N P A

THE question is whether at this stage, any reforms can save Marcos or prevent an eventual revolutionary upheaval in Philippine politics, said Robert A. Manning in *Foreign Affairs*. "Aside from eroding the traditional checks and balances of Philippine institutions, nearly two witnessed a plunder of the economy, the monumental misallocation of resources, and a gross distortion

of the free enterprise system. High level corruption, documented by the findings of the Agrava Commission (appointed to investigate the Aquino assassination), has undermined the authority of the military, and a broadbased revolutionary insurgency, led by the communist New People's Army, has grown tenfold since martial law was declared in 1972."

Overall, a valuable assessment of the NPA is available in the 1983 US Congressional testimony of James A. Kelly of the US Defense Department.

The New People's Army . . . remains the principal organized security challenge to the Philippine government. It has an estimated guerilla strength of about 10,000 with perhaps less than seventy-five percent possessing arms. The NPA is active to varying degrees in nearly all areas of the country. About one-fourth of all villages are affected by guerilla activity; the most-affected currently are in Northeast and Southeast Luzon and Eastern Mindanao. Guerillas remain militarily inferior to the Philippine Armed Forces but are able to carry out success-

fully limited actions to acquire weapons.

K B L

IN *Today's Revolution: Democracy*, Ferdinand Marcos categorized our political system as personalized, as gravitating around leaders but never on issues, and that there really were no fighting causes for which a man could dedicate himself and devote his lifework and life span.

Fourteen years after the book was published, Arturo Tolentino was fired as Foreign Minister and Blas Ople resigned as Labor Minister.

In the Malacañang dog house is Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile who had a confrontation with the First Lady on the growing strength of the NPA.

Will Enrile be the next to be lost to the KBL after Rafael Salas, Emmanuel Pelaez, Salvador Lopez, Gerardo Sicat, O.D. Corpus, Reuben Canoy, Francisco Tatad, and Carlos P. Romulo?

What will happen to Prime Minister Cesar Virata after his recent expose of cronyism at the Batasan?

CSO: 4200/804

7 May 1985

PHILIPPINES

OPPOSITION TO MARTIAL LAW FOR MINDANAO NOTED

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 13

[Article by Letty Suico]

[Text] MP Inday Nita Cortes Daluz and Atty. Bernardito Florido of the Free Legal Assistance Volunteers Association yesterday expressed their negative reaction to a Batasan resolution seeking to declare Mindanao "a national emergency" area.

"It's a pity", Daluz said, it's a clear manifestation of the administration's bankruptcy in ways and means in resolving the problems in this country."

She said the answer to injustice, oppression and economic dislocation is definitely not Martial Law. Instead, the restoration of sanity in the country is needed, not martial rule, she added.

She urged the administration heed the people's cry for justice. Only then, according to her, can the country have a real honest to goodness peace and order situation

In a separate interview, Florido objected on the ground that it will only compound the problem. He said the peace and order situation in Mindanao can only be solved in three ways, and these are: (1) by professionalizing the military, (2) by upgrading the administration of justice, and (3) by giving the people freedom to earn their livelihood in peace.

Florido said a civilian has no motive in fabricating stories like military abuses or human rights violation. All th want is to be able to live in peace, he added. Therefore, according to him the government should not only see the effect, but the causes as well of complaints of abuses and injustice which remained unsolved.

Mindanao will soon be polarized if and when Martail Law is declared in the area, Florido said, because then, gradually, its processes will be very different and time will come when a passport will be required before anybody can enter Mindanao.

It may be recalled that MP Regalado E. Maambong (KBL-Cebu) introduced Resolution No. 275 which seeks to declare Mindanao a "national emergency" area. The resolution was signed by 14 other Batasan members.

The said resolution at the same time enjoins the Batasan to "declare as a national policy the suppression of the reported widespread deterioration of the peace and order condition in Mindanao and provide measures to effectively carry out such policy in accordance with Art. VIII, Sec. 15 in relation to Art. VII, Section II of the Constitution."

CSO: 4200/804

7 May 1985

PHILIPPINES

DAILY LAUDS 'KNOWLEDGEABLE,' 'CONCERNED' U.S. TESTIMONY

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 10 Mar 85 p 3

[Editorial: "American Friends Speak Out"]

[Text] Under ordinary circumstances, we should not tolerate any form of interference from the Americans in our national affairs. Such an act could constitute intervention and would be viewed as an insult to our sense of national self-respect.

But in the hearing at the Asia-Pacific Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives in Washington, D. C. the other day, as reported by the Associated Press, the testimonies of American experts on the Philippine situation were not only relevant and timely, they are intended to save the Philippines from its present evil plight.

Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific and Asia Affairs during the term of ex-President Jimmy Carter said: "We have to face up to a terrible fact--that Marcos, after a career of some brilliance, is now intellectually and politically bankrupt.

"We must make clear to the Filipino people that aid to the Philippines is not aid to Marcos.

"He should finish his term, but he should also be asked not to run again, and not to pass his power on to his wife."

Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz, a pro-Filipino committee member, said "a discredited leadership, a declining economy and a growing communist insurgency have placed the future of the Philippines...in jeopardy.

"The United States must be careful to avoid falling into another Iranian or Nicaraguan situation, where our support for undemocratic and repressive regime's ultimately led to the demise of our formerly close relationships."

Prof. Claude Buss of Stanford University and the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School in Monterey, California, said "the best thing Marcos could do would be to announce he no longer intended to seek another term and to guarantee free and fair elections. But there is no sign that he has such plans."

Kansas State University Prof. Linda K. Richter urged cutting aid to a minimum and suggested allowing Marcos to fear that the United States planned to oust him.

Prof. David Joel Steinberg of Brandeis University said the United States should use its financial muscle to encourage democracy in the Philippines. He added: "If democracy is restored, the US should offer large-scale aid. If positive change is not forthcoming aid should be cut."

These testimonies came from American experts knowledgeable about what is taking place in our country. They are deeply concerned that the dictatorial Marcos government has brought about the death of democracy, that Filipinos are living under repressive conditions and that the current economic pinch has resulted in the cruellest economic difficulty Filipinos have ever experienced. They are also aware that communist insurgency has been spreading because of repressive and oppressive policies of the Marcos government.

To their suggestions that the U.S. government should do something for the return of the democratic processes which will only become possible if Marcos is out, freedom-loving Filipinos can only say: "So be it."

CSO: 4200/804

PHILIPPINES

DAVAO PAPER 'SUGGESTS' ALTERNATE ECONOMIC MEASURES

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 9 Mar 85 pp 2, 7

[Commentary by Greg A. Palabrica: "A Few Suggestions Worth Trying--Stop Printing Mickey Mouse Money"]

[Text] As the rains fall, a sort of coolness has settled over most of Davao. Floods will come though not yet in dangerous strength, except in Davao del Norte. Grasses turn green. Plants are responding in their foliage and growth, while coconuts are blooming again in flowers but low priced in copra. Export bananas are uniformly American size. Many barrio roads now turn muddy and slippery but back to slip shot repairs and patching. And the ardour for armed encounters seems to cool down, unless the rebels and the army push thru their offensive. Still big ambushes can flare up. Many rebels or terrorist, as the government calls them dispersed in small groups, while the government are picking them, one by one, according to news reports.

Meanwhile, assassination and salvages are also the daily fare. Still our will to improve and survive is there.

While there is some progress in the government actions, a lot will be erased by the actual devaluation, inflation and by the increase of the gas tax and other taxes. Increased interest on loans will dampen investment. A long and continuing range of goods, services, labor and commodities will rise too in price. They will surely be a great burden to an already impoverished people.

For now law yet has been invented that can DAMN the law of demand and supply nor put a safety fuse in the continuing cause and effect aspect of high taxes, inflation, and devaluation, plus high interest rate. Even price control will not work. A little return to sanity from the old homespun Philippine economy can be of help. We suggest!

1. Stop and for control foreign and domestic borrowings;
2. Impose a balanced budget and cut government expenses to the barest minimum. Cut the ministries from 15 to 16 to only seven like in Britain or the U.S. Meanwhile pour more of the savings in roads, bridges and other infrastructures, that can employ people;

3. Stop the over printing of more pesos that can turn into Japanese mickey mouse money or into guerilla emergency notes, value wise.

4. Limit importation only to the most essential;

5. Pour low interest production loans and short term and in agriculture mainly. Never mind the other industries. They are actually white elephants and simply drain our pesos and dollars and bring the national economy to disaster.

6. But specially turn attention to gold mining in Region II.

7. Use more countertrade or barter;

8. Treat farming or agriculture as a business industry and not a demagogues basis for politics or as a politics or as a political issue nor as an object of institutionalized exploitation. Cut down so many government interferences on business and industry;

9. Slow down on socialistic tendencies which is now wreaking havoc on affluent nations like Sweden, England, West Germany, France, etc. Stimulate more production, instead of dole out. We are not a rich country and we can't afford it. Neither are we under Bismarck's Imperial Germany that conceived socialism;

10. Produce first before giving short or long term government handouts;

11. Cut the funding for land reform. It never helped again peace: instead it enabled the small land owners and the impoverished tenant to give sympathy to the NPA's nationwide. Land reform never worked in Central Luzon, the birthplace of the N P.A.;

12. Have more enduring policies gain the people's trust in government credibility;

13. Impose peace and order and respect life liberty and property;

Definitely, the last is the magic key to any progress and political and economic stability.

These prescriptions are better said than done, for no politician in his right mind will ever take them. Otherwise, he insures his political death. Unless Pres. Marcos divorces his personality from a slugging politician to a statesmen, he will leave the country worse than when he came to power 20 years ago. Already he has left a long trail of mess.

CSO: 4200/804

7 May 1985

PHILIPPINES

MANILA MAYORS REAFFIRM LOYALTY TO RULING PARTY

HK221541 Manila METRO MANILA TIMES in English 22 Apr 85 pp 1, 5

[Article by Lulu Principe]

[Text] Metro Manila mayors yesterday pledged to accept and abide by any decision handed down by the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in the selection of party candidates for Metro Manila towns and cities in the local elections of 1986.

The mayors also said they would not run for reelection under any political party except the KBL.

The mayors gave their pledge to Vice Governor Ismael Mathay Jr. who met with them to resolve current intraparty differences.

Mathay called the meeting following reports that seven out of the 17 metro mayors were planning to join other political parties in case they were junked by the KBL.

The mayors issued the statements following a pronouncement from the KBL that the party would field only young, new faces in Metro Manila.

The mayors were also quite vocal about their plans to switch party loyalty at the latest meeting of their organization--the Metro Manila Mayor's League, which was well-covered by the media.

Differences within the Metro Manila KBL also deepened when a group of vice mayors met and announced that several of them would be interested to run for mayor in their respective localities.

Yesterday, the mayors formalized their pledge in a one-page resolution which Mathay is expected to submit to President Marcos, titular head of the KBL.

All the Metro Manila mayors, except Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing who did not attend the meeting, signed the resolution.

The local chief executives said they would abide by whatever decision the President and the KBL Central Committee would make in selecting the candidates for Metro Manila.

They said, "such a decision shall definitely be in the best interest of the party and the country."

Earlier, in an interview with METRO MANILA TIMES, Bagatsing said he would surely run in the coming local polls.

"But if the KBL would junk me, I will run as an independent candidate," he said.

"Joining the opposition party, however, would be my last resort," he added.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

BALWEG ADMITS COMMUNISM, CRITICIZES CATHOLICISM

HK231016 Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 10 Apr 85 pp 4, 5

["By-line" column by Casim Arkoncel]

[Text] Some people who do not believe in the communist threat simply had not realized that the unabated killings particularly in Davao City are the direct result of communist insurgency. In a war of ideologies government soldiers, including policemen as well as rebels are tactical combatants, hence the continued warfare in eliminating each other. Very few killings result from stabbing or shooting duels nowadays, although "contracts" should not be disregarded either. Hired guns are available for a small fee.

It appears that the Catholic Church does not concern itself with the communist threat. Known church leaders opposed to the Marcos administration have been silent on the issue of communism, perhaps because the communists are anti-Marcos. The growing involvement of Catholic priests in subversive activities was at first thought as a mere part of the struggle "to restore democracy" in the country.

The recent arrest of Fr. Teodoro Remigio in Ilocos Norte resulted in a denial of any link with the NPA which the priest insisted before the press, maybe because he is under detention and charged with subversion. It is different with renegade priest, Fr. Conrado Balweg, SVD, who has taken to the hills as an NPA or communist commander. In a recent interview which was published in Japan, Balweg had made it clear that he is now a communist critical of Catholicism.

Asked what made him embrace communism, Balweg said, "My curiosity toward communism was born from being called one. Then, when I began to read about communism, I found out that without realizing it, I was already a communist. From that point, it was not difficult for me to embrace Marxism for the simple reason that if you practice what Christianity really is, you cannot escape being called a communist."

Balweg expressed the reason for joining the armed struggle and why he no longer believed in Catholicism when he said, "Slowly I began to realize that the church as an institution was not interested in the people. Even as a student, I experienced problems because of my involvement in social issues.

When I became a priest, I saw ever more clearly that the church as an institution did not respond to the plight of the exploited masses."

Marxism and Christianity may have the same end of looking after the benefit of the people, but Balweg doesn't think so anymore. He views religion as a creation of man that people must be educated to have a proper understanding as a mass religion that should not be a stumbling block to a revolution.

Following the publication of Balweg's interview, the church hierarchy has remained silent. In the past it concerned itself of the human rights of detained priests accused of subversion. Today it has to make a stand on whether to continue to abet a Godless ideology.

Nevertheless, religion has been a strong reality for our people to resist communism knowing that Christianity and Marxism cannot mix.

In the meantime, the war goes on and more people will meet their untimely death because they believe in a cause. Sooner or later they will die for it. If the revolution triumphs, the rebels will be the new heroes. And what happens of the church? Balweg could well take the place of Cardinal Sin. But if Marcos prevails, Sin can continue to criticize the city of Man as a sin city.

For the church today finds itself in a different scenario than what it was during the Spanish regime. During those times, the church and government were wedded. Balweg could well be any one of the leaders of the Katipunan denouncing the Spanish tyranny as he is now despising the Marcos regime. Although it was a different scenario because there were no communists at the time.

From the way our people react to the warning against the threats posed by communism, it seems that many even understand less of Catholicism than Marxism. Which reminds us of an anecdote about a meeting of a priest and a communist. Asked how his Faith was, the priest said, "Practising but not believing." On communism, the man admitted, "Believing but not practising."

CSO: 4200/831

PHILIPPINES

UPDATE ON DETAINEE, FRIENDS ALLEGEDLY LINKED TO BALWEG

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 9 Mar 85 p 5

["Counterpoint" colum by Peppot L. Ilagan: "Three Women"]

[Text] MARCH 10, last year, we carried a front page story entitled: "Armed men abduct two women." It went like this: *"THREE men armed with caliber .45 automatics abducted two women from a house at Bayan Park 8:30 Friday night."*

"Neighbors reported this to Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) lawyers who are investigating the case."

"Allegedly abducted were Mina Bayangan of No. 7 Bayan Park and her unidentified guest."

"Neighbors said the armed men acted 'like military officers' thus raising the theory that it was not an abduction but an arrest."

"Flag lawyers said this could not be a kidnapping because no ransom note or demand has been received."

"As of press time, police sources reported no knowledge of the reported abduction."

WHAT has happened since then is a very interesting case to ponder on as we mark the end of the first decade celebrating women internationally.

Cora Cortel, the "unidentified guest," marks her full year in captivity. She is held under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) for allegedly being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Charges of subversion are being heard. The military have tagged her as "Ka Loida" allegedly in the order of battle. She is even alleged to be the "wife" of rebel priest Conrado Balweg.

Mina Bayangan, who was mistaken for a certain "Georgina Dao-il," was released that same night. She filed charges against

the men who "abducted" her. The military intelligence agents, in turn, have filed subversion charges against her. She is allegedly a cousin of Balweg. The charges she filed have not prospered, as far as we have been informed. She is now in hiding.

Georgina Dao-il, on the other hand, was the one who reported the "abduction". The military claims she is also a subversive, alias "Girlie," the companion of Cortel, both of whom, intelligence agents claim, had been under intensive surveillance prior to their "capture" that night a year ago. She is nowhere to be found.

I HAVE MET only two of these three women, Cora and Mina. Aside from the military's charges against them, I have found no reason to believe that they could be guilty of endangering the national security. Whatever they did, the court will decide on the basis of evidence. To me, all they did was something not common to most modern Filipinas. They dared act for what they must have been convinced, was within their rights. But there are many more women like them. I am told, doing what they think is right, even if this means not running the risk of being suspect, even of capture, as "subversive" by the military.

Still it is to such as these three women -- to Cora in captivity, to Mina who is being hunted down, and to Georgina who is nowhere to be found -- that such celebrations as "International Women's Day," March 9 this year, should also be dedicated to. Whether we, including the military, like it or not, these three are also standards with and against

whom we can measure the ends and limits our women would go to in pursuance of their beliefs and ideals.

Yes, true, and I agree, there are other women, many of them, past and present, who should be remembered and honored for various deeds, distinction, achievements and ideals on this day. These, most certainly, are worthy of becoming paradigms and living examples of what Filipina women can do.

But for the sheerness, never mind the timeliness of what has happened to these three, it is them I really think of more than anybody else on this day. I wonder and worry: how many more will be like them in our city I dare not wish there would be no one else like them in our midst.

Perhaps that this only because of the incorrigible romantic in me.* For March 9, 1985

CSO: 4200/804

PHILIPPINES

REPORTER'S IMPRESSIONS OF U.S. SECURITY POLICIES SEMINAR

HK191459 Manila BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Apr 85 pp 5, 22

[Article by Marites Danguilan Vitug]

[Text] Washington wears its mantle of power proudly, some would say uncaringly, the world seemingly at its disposal. It is in the neat conference rooms of this tiny city where policymakers and bureaucrats in business suits shape the fate of Third World countries.

In these rooms, it was decided that America would drop bombs in Vietnam; that it would destabilize Nicaragua, and that it would give its support to an unpopular Philippine government.

It is what an American columnist has called "cultivated killing." The "killers" may never actually see the blood shed from the violence resulting from the national security programs they have devised.

Twenty-one of us--journalists, professors, military officers--from 18 countries all over the world were allowed a peep into this setting as participants in a month-long seminar on U.S. security policies.

We saw Americans insisting on the existence of a "Soviet threat" and their view of the world as divided into East and West, peered into their high-technology defense weapons industry, and listened to debates on President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars," and the current arms control talks.

("Star Wars" refers to Reagan's proposed strategic defense initiative, a research program to boost U.S. capability in "intercepting and destroying strategic ballistic missiles before they reach American soil.")

America's concerns are different. They worry about stemming the arms race yet they never cease to build up their arsenals and develop new models of fighter planes and battle tanks, and more accurate and efficient missiles.

They are troubled by international terrorism, which they call "warfare without territory," and continuously prepare for it.

They don't like things to "get out of hand" in allied countries. A State Department lecturer talks of "not fully embracing an unstable government because we will antagonize the next..." while a Defense Department official admits, "We Americans like to step in and take charge even when we shouldn't."

Sometimes one wonders what to the U.S., is the difference between a sovereign nation and a toy in its backyard.

A morning with key people of the National Security Council revealed a mindset that is conservative and much too obsessed with the U.S.-USSR conflict. The Latin American affairs adviser spoke of using public and behind-the-scenes diplomacy to help protect governments from "aggression from the Soviets."

The NSC expert on arms control talked of the Soviet Union arms buildup, and was peeved at observations from some participants that the U.S. appeared to be exaggerating Russian superiority in the arms race.

A young man, in proper suit and bow tie, introduced as the director for European and Soviet affairs, preached on the "imperial power" that is the Soviet Union. This power, he said, has an "unlimited appetite" for domination.

No, he said, the U.S. harbors no "hostile geopolitical offensive" against the Russians. No, the U.S. does not acquire weapons for offensive purposes, only for defensive and deterrent reasons.

But in Fort Hood, Texas, the largest U.S. Army installation, an officer smilingly boasted, "We can go to war tomorrow."

And they showed us combat exercises. Perched on a mountain top, with binoculars, we watched tanks roll in muddy terrain, swiftly, quietly and unobtrusively, blending with the trees. We saw sparks come out of the mouths of the tanks' cannons, as they aimed at a target and hit it.

The U.S. Army was also testing the Apache attack helicopter, a very new model. It whirred and glided through the sky as if ready for combat. By 1987, the U.S. Army will have already ordered a total of 675 Apaches.

At the Edwards Air Force Base in California, we marvelled at the sleek fighter planes glistening in the sun. We were briefed on the qualities of various weapons and aircraft fighters. It was a virtual supermarket of bombs and planes, the choice about as easy as deciding between cream cheese and blue cheese.

For the uninitiate, it was both fascinating and frightening seeing and touching the war planes, knowing what they could do.

For instance, the B-1B, as they call it, is a multi-role bomber which can carry nuclear air-to-ground missiles. The fact sheet says the B-1B will be able to penetrate present and predicted sophisticated Soviet defenses well into the 1990's.

The F-16 air combat fighter is said to be of "high performance" with "excellent air-to-air combat maneuverability." Moreover, it is difficult to detect and hard to hit.

And there, too was the ALCM, the air-launched cruise missile, a jet-powered self-guided flying bomb. It unfolds its wings and flies in predetermined routes to its targets.

At present, the base is exploring the use of "voice command" wherein an airplane could fly without a pilot, responding merely to the pilot's voice.

There were other models: the Night Hawk designed to rescue downed airmen and other personnel in all types of weather and terrain, including hostile environments; and the F-15 Eagle, an all-weather, "extremely maneuverable" tactical fighter.

But the thought disturbs: what if these same planes were to someday fly in other countries' skies and drop off missiles in other lands and the newest battle tanks roll on one's own earth?

Will America again make a decision from faraway Washington so removed from the travails of other countries?

Today, many Americans say they feel a "new wave of patriotism" engulfing their country. "The mood of the country is one which Reagan exemplifies and reflects...a conservative one," says Marshall D. Shulman, international relations professor at the Columbia University.

Reagan has a great deal of public support. He is even called the "teflon president" because none of his mistakes seem to stick; they're easily dissociated from him.

It is also said that when Reagan was voted into power, many separated the person from his foreign policy. Someone even remarked: "How can you say no to your grandfather?"

But the "new patriotism" in America, it is felt, is expressed mostly in military terms, in how much more to spend for defense, in building up arms. Politics, to them, it seems, is a matter of military strength and voting into power someone who upholds it--in a process called elections. To small nations, politics is a matter of life and death.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

OPLE FILES BILL TO CURB FOREIGN FUNDING OF PARTIES

HK191427 Manila BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Apr 85 p 22

[Text] Lucena City--Labor Minister Blas F. Ople said yesterday he is leading a move in the Batasang Pambansa to enact curbs on foreign funding of political parties in the light of disclosures that an opposition party had received more than a million pesos from unspecified European sources.

Ople said a parliamentary bill to that effect will be filed next week by a bipartisan group of parliamentarians. The bill will establish severe penalties for failure to disclose foreign contributions to political parties and social groupings engaged in activities with political implications.

"The control and regulation of foreign funds for political purposes are critical to the preservation of national independence and national security and must therefore take precedence on the agenda of the Batasan," Ople said.

He said it was common knowledge that scores of institutions in Europe and the United States were aggressively recruiting client organizations in the Third World that would reflect their international objectives in the conduct of domestic politics, "most of these sources are well-meaning but objectively their aid to political groups unless fully disclosed can partake of covert intervention in national affairs and naked violations of our national sovereignty," he said.

The move to curb foreign funding of political parties was spurred by the internal squabble rocking the PDP-LABAN [Philippine Democratic Party-Lakas ng Bayan] about the alleged failure of its leadership to account for P [Pesos] 1.3 million said to have been received from a source in Europe. PDP-LABAN president, Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, disclaimed knowledge of such fund receipts and accused his critics of waging black propaganda against him.

CSO: 4200/830

PHILIPPINES

REPORT SHOWS DECLINE IN U.S. INVESTMENTS

HK221408 Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 13 Apr 85 p 3

[Text] Direct American investments in the Philippines have been declining since 1981 while they have been posting increases of as high as 25 percent in the rest of Southeast Asia, it was learned from the National Economic and Development Authority [NEDA] yesterday.

NEDA records show that direct investments of Americans, who make up the largest single nationality of foreign investors in the Philippines, had dropped by 1.7 percent from 1981 to 1982, then by a steeper 15 percent from 1982 to 1983, and are likely to drop further in 1984 as the country's political and economic crisis triggered a spate of divestments by foreign investors. The total values of American direct investments in the Philippines in these three years were \$1.32 billion, \$1.297 billion, and \$1.102 billion, respectively.

In contrast, the same records show, American investments had been increasing in the Philippines' Southeast Asian neighbors. From 1982 to 1983 alone, U.S. investments in four such countries, which like the Philippines belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, increased by \$789 million or an average of 13 percent from slightly about \$6 billion.

The country-by-country breakdown follows:

Indonesia, from \$2.615 billion in 1982 to \$3.042 billion in 1983 up by 16 percent; Malaysia, by 8.5 percent from \$1.030 billion to \$1.118 billion; Singapore, from \$1.835 billion to \$1.965 billion, or 7.8 percent; and Thailand, a whopping 24.6 percent from \$585 million to \$729 million.

In various economic forecasts for different countries in the region in 1985, including one by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, all of Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines, is expected to post [as published] growths in gross national product--one country at a rate as high as 10 percent. One prediction for the Philippines is a 2 percent negative growth rate, and this is seen to draw foreign investments away from it and to its neighbors. Asia is considered the highest economic growth area.

Other factors blamed for the decline in foreign investments not only from America but also from other countries are "complex" government regulations and administrative red tape, NEDA sources said.

American direct investments were highest in the manufacturing sector, but where it was noted to have declined progressively from \$564 million in 1981 to \$444 million in 1982 and to only \$389 million in 1983.

U.S. investments in trade also traced a downtrend from \$93 million in 1981 to \$80 million in 1982 and to only \$58 million in 1983. In the mining industry, investments are down to less than \$500,000 due to the depressed state of the sector over the years.

CSO: 4200/830

7 May 1985

PHILIPPINES

HARBOR STRIKE ENDS; VIOLENCE IN TRANSIT STRIKE

HK200036 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 19 Apr 85

[Text] The strike which paralyzed operations at the international port at South Harbor in Manila is over. The more than 1,600 dock workers returned to work yesterday [19 April], following a marathon conciliation meeting between union leaders and the management of Metroport Services. The agreement, mediated by Deputy Labor Minister Carmelo Noriel, ended a 2-day strike which cost losses in revenues estimated at between 30 and 50 million pesos. In the agreement the port services management agreed to extend the retirement age of workers to 65, grant the workers a 6-month sick leave, fill up vacant positions, and refrain from undertaking union-busting activities.

But even as the port strike was settled, another walkout hit a transportation firm in Quezon City. Some 300 drivers and conductors of J.D. Transsit struck yesterday against alleged unfair labor practices by the management. The strikers are demanding the immediate remittance of their contributions to the (pakhebic) fund and the social security system, a halt in alleged illegal suspension and dismissal of workers, and the granting of salary loans and retirement benefits. Violence marred the strike when two drivers and two conductors were injured when they tried to prevent management sympathizers from driving four buses from the company premises.

CSO: 4200/831

PHILIPPINES

NPA OCCUPATION, RETALIATION AGAINST BARRIO REPORTED

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Pris Rojo]

[Text] Alvar, a barangay situated 26 kilometers from the Poblacion of Caraga, Davao Oriental, to the highlands is now under the control of the New People's Army who burned the P80-T houses of the Barangay Captain yesterday at 5:00 o'clock P.M. in retaliation to the repeated refusal of the barangay chief executive to help their cause and instead reported their activities to the military.

In a flash report of P/Captain Sefuentes Station Commander of Caraga, to the PC-INP Provincial Command of Davao Oriental, it was learned that there are 80 to 100 armed NPAs who are now occupying the barangay. They are hacking the carabaos, pigs and other animals of the barangay head mentioned only as Barangay Captain Caetano.

The report stated that government troopers in the municipality are lesser in number and reinforcements is ardently requested. The reclearing of the barangay from the NPA hands, as of the moment is hindered by logs, rains and inclement weather. The Caraga station commander is requesting not only for more troops but jackets.

While government troops are nesting in the barangay poblacion but in the outskirts surrounding the area within shooting distance are the NPAs who engaged with them in sporadic firings.

The element of bad weather and smaller number of troops we prolonge the complete retaking or clearing of the entire territory of one of the biggest barangay areawise, in Caraga with 3,145.25 hectares.

While this developed, concerned citizens of Mati resented the fact that in spite of the repeated request of the provincial government of Davao Oriental and the military to send one battalion of government troopers to the province the top military hierarchy of the region is adamant to send even one company.

In Mati, last night, intermittent firings of guns were heard just beyond the outskirts of the poblacion. Encounters of government troopers and the NPAs

are taking place in the neighboring areas with the Provincial Commander himself Col. Carlos Pena personally leading or commanding the government troops.

When will the concern high ranking officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines send more troops to Davao Oriental?" The same concerned citizens asked.

They said: "Surigao del Sur has one battalion; Davao del Norte has three Battalions; Davao del Sur has one battalion; South Cotabato has one battalion; Davao City has several battalions; and why has Davao Oriental only companies?"

In an interview with Col. Pena by this writer, last night, he said "While the situation is under control but it can't be denied that I need more troops. I am personally directing my men in the fields in order to obtain information about the encounter. He revealed that just the other night just within the hearing distance of firings, they ambushed a good number of NPAs roasint a dog but left the palatable viand "when we fired at them. Three died instantly while many who were wounded were brought by their comrades."

When asked as to what action he has to take with the Alvar situation in Caraga, the Provincial Commander retorted, "This is a highly military secret."

CSO: 4200/804

PHILIPPINES

KALINGA-APAYAO MILITARY, NPA ATROCITIES

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Alfred P. Dizon]

[Text]

A FAMILY of three and their companion were gunned down in broad daylight while farming their swidden field in Conner, Kalinga-Apayao, allegedly by soldiers of the 48th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

Killed were Luis Balicao, 50, his wife, Marina, their 20-year old son, Arcadio and their companion, Luis Ca-ot.

Reports reaching the GOLD ORE stated that the victims were farming their swidden (kaingin) fields along with other villagers in barangay Malama, Conner last February 26 when they were surrounded by soldiers at around 10 a.m. Ca-ot and members of the Balicao family were shot reportedly for providing shelter to the New People's Army (NPA).

Earlier, last February 21, some people of Barangay Banban sought the advice of their barangay officials who were instructed to surrender all residents who have been feeding the NPA's. The villagers were required to register their names and report to the Army post until February 28.

The villagers complied and started trekking down to Karikitan for registration last March 4. To date, seven of them from Conner are still detained in Bulanao, Tabuk on suspicion of being NPA sympathizers. The detainees are Tito Berlan, Fernandez Abbago, Salvador Ladino, Juan Carian, Benito Dagwat, Gilberto Ancheta and Benjamin Mateo.

An Army officer and a jeepney driver, meanwhile, were killed while nine others, including a child and pregnant woman, were wounded when the fiero passenger jeep they were riding was ambushed by the NPA last Friday, March 1, at Turayok, the border site separating Tuao, Cagayan and Conner, K-A. Identities of the casualties could not be ascertained as of press time.

Sergeant Salvador Parizal, detachment commander of the PC-INP in Conner, and three other companions trailing the passenger vehicle about 100 meters behind witnessed the ambush.

Sgt. Parizal said about 30 NPA's positioned strategically between rocks and trees overlooking the area sprayed the jeepney with automatic rifle fire. Outnumbered, the constabulary men abandoned their vehicle for fear that some of the NPA's might ambush them from behind.

PHILIPPINES

MILITARY ARMS FISHERMEN AGAINST PIRATES

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] General Santos City--Members of the Sarangani Bay Fishermen Association are now determined to fight against the sea pirates because they are now trained and armed by the military.

This was the report of Martin Tan, the association's president, during the conference/dialogue with Brig. Gen. Jaime C. Echeverria, commanding general of the Regional Unified Command in Region XI.

The conference attended by the fishing operators at the headquarters of the Southwestern Forces (Task Force Buanyan) last Thursday was an offshoot of the dialogue held last Dec. 22, 1984 on the growing problem of sea piracy.

Brig. Gen. Echeverria had previously promised the fishing operators to help them in combatting sea piracy along the Moro Gulf in Basilan and Zamboanga.

According to Tan, scores of fishermen had been killed and millions of pesos had been lost not counting the economic dislocation of 27,500 dependents to sea piracy. The problem started three years ago it had adversely effected the fishing industry in this city.

The Sarangani Bay Fishermen are the primary tuna producers in Mindanao. They supply tuna markets covering the provinces of Davao, Cotabato, Surigao, Agusan and Bukidnon as well as canneries and exporters of sashimi to Japan, Italy and Taiwan.

The RUC-XI commander had urged the fishing operators to strengthen their organization and adopt standard operating procedures that will make them more effective in their drive against sea piracy.

Other military officials who attended the dialogue were Col. Orlando Soriano of the Sovesfor, Lt. Col Douglas O. Rosete, commander of the 11th Civil Relations Group, CRSAP P, Capt. Domingo Gazzingan of the Airborne, and Lt. Col. Benjamin Juanitas of the RU C-XI.

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

22 NPA REBELS KILLED--Twenty-two members of the NPA were killed in separate encounters with government troopers in Barangay Fuente, Pantukan, Davao del Norte. The full report from Jun Francisco: [Begin recording] Troopers, backed by followers of Nur Khan, the MNLF chieftain who surrendered to President Marcos last February 9, engaged some 150 terrorists in a running gunbattle, killing 15 NPA men. Nur Khan, who was interviewed by this reporter at Camp Aguinaldo this morning, said his followers were also able to capture several NPA training camps in Upper Pantukan, Davao del Norte. The terrorists, who hastily left camp before the arrival of the former MNLF, left behind [words indistinct] sets and ammunition of various calibers. Nur Khan said one of his trusted lieutenants, identified as Ramon Pangilan, was wounded in the gunbattle. He was airlifted to the armed forces medical center in Quezon City for treatment. Because of the continuous hot pursuit operations against the NPA in Davao del Norte, Nur Khan said the NPA men were forced to flee to the neighboring province of Davao Oriental. In a related development, seven more NPA's and one member of the Civilian Home Defense Force [CHDF] were killed in encounters in Bataan and Pangasinan. The troopers recovered a Springfield rifle, hand grenades, and subversive documents. [end recording] [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 0800 GMT 22 Apr 85]

LOCAL SUPERVISION OF POLICE FINALIZED--The proposed rules and regulations for the transfer of operational supervision and direction over police forces to mayors were finalized yesterday for approval by President Marcos. The rules and regulations of executive order number 1012 were prepared by five working committees headed by Deputy Minister of Local Government Eduardo Soliman, Jr, Vice Governor Ismael Mathay, Jr, Police Brig. Gen. Hermilo Ahorro, AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Brig. Gen. Felix Bona and AFP Deputy Chief of Staff Commodore Serapio Martellano. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 18 Apr 85]

MARCOS THANKS JAPAN--President Marcos today expressed gratitude to the government and people of Japan for their generous assistance to the Philippines in times of need. The president told this to Ambassador (Kiyoshi Sumiya) who presented his letters of credence as the new envoy of Japan to the Philippines. The chief executive likewise expressed gratitude for the insistence of Japan for IMF approval of the country's loan restructuring and economic recovery program. The president also took the occasion to discuss

Japan's inter-dependent relations with ASEAN, of which the Philippines is a member. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 1100 GMT 19 Apr 85]

GOVERNMENT SAYS INFLATION RATE DOWN--The government has brought down the inflation rate to manageable levels, and only the high interest rates remain to be checked in order to spur economic activity. Trade and Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin noted that inflation peaked at 63 percent in November last year, but prudent government management has brought this down to 39 percent last March. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 1100 GMT 22 Apr 85]

CSO: 4200/831

SOLOMON ISLANDS

BRIEFS

POPULATION GROWTH THREATENS ECONOMY--In the Solomons the GDP grew by 3.2 per cent, stimulated by a 26 per cent rise in export earnings. Thanks for that go to its fledgling, but booming, fishing industry which produced 32,400 tonnes of fish exports worth nearly \$US30 million in 1983. The Solomons ran into political snags with one of its principal fish export markets late last year when it arrested the American super-seiner Jeanette B for allegedly fish poaching in its waters. That excited the wrath of the United States Government, which invoked trade sanctions. Business revenue of the large corporations in the Solomons, which had become stagnant in 1981, increased by 20 per cent in 1983. Inflation, which had been running at about 14 per cent at the beginning of this decade, has been brought down to about 10 per cent. An area of major concern to the Solomons is its rapid population growth rate. The percentage annual growth of 3.8 is one of the highest in Asia and the Pacific and well above the world average of 1.7 per cent. [Excerpt] [Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 11 Mar 85 p 6]

CSO: 4200/825

VANUATU

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IMPROVES--Vanuatu gets many words of praise from the report for the remarkable way in which it mended an economy almost destroyed by pre- and post-independence wrangles and a minor civil war. Restructuring an economy which was once heavily dependent on one of its two colonial masters, France, and localising hundreds of jobs which had previously been filled by European civil servants were some of the main tasks. Vanuatu embarked on land reform to return mostly European and Asian-owned land to traditional Melanesian custom owners. New export markets have been found in Belgium and Holland to replace France, but Vanuatu still desperately needs more markets for some of her products. Tourism, which suffered badly during the independence period, is booming again and new cement and garment factories have been built under a general scheme to reduce dependence on certain overseas imports. Foreign aid used for budget support was running at 38 per cent of the country's total revenue in 1981 but had been reduced to 24 per cent by 1983. The country's off-shore banking facilities are still providing much needed income but Vanuatu suffers from what has become the Melanesian malaise--high population growth. It is running at 3 per cent a year and Papua New Guinea's population growth is only slightly lower at 2.4 per cent. [Excerpt] [Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 11 Mar 85 p 6]

CSO: 4200/826

WESTERN SAMOA

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK BRIGHTER--Western Samoa, which was one of the first Island nations to recognise, and experience, the problems of rapid population growth, has now brought its growth rate down to 0.9 per cent, well below the world average. Samoa also enjoyed the advantage of being able to export much of its surplus population to countries like New Zealand and the United States.

Western Samoa, the only Island nation officially listed as a least-developed nation by the United Nations, economically did well. It reversed a negative economic trend and attained a 0.5 per cent GDP growth rate. In 1981 its GDP was listed as minus 9.1 per cent. A revival in demand and better prices for Samoa's three main exports, coconut, taro and cocoa, have helped, as have new Government policies. Since 1980, 24 new industries have been established in Samoa under the Government's enterprises incentives scheme. Under the scheme, companies enjoy tax holidays for up to five years and exemption from customs duties on imported inputs. Sites have been made available for long term overseas investors and these Samoan exports benefit from tariff advantages because Samoa has a least-developed nation designation. Samoa has managed this growth on slightly less foreign aid than it used to get and it has also reduced its foreign debt servicing ratio from 20 per cent in 1979 to less than 16 per cent. [Excerpt] [Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 11 Mar 85 p 6]

CSO: 4200/827

JPRS-SEA-85-074
7 May 1985

DISTRUST, FEAR OF KHMER ROUGE CONTINUES WITHIN CGDK

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 11 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Denis Gray]

[Text]

ARANYAPRATHET (Thailand). — Nearly 10 years after their victorious onslaught on the Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge are fighting desperate battles for their very survival on the western rim of Kampuchea.

In 1975, the enemy was the US-backed regime of President Lon Nol, which hoisted its white flags on April 17 after the battle-hardened guerrillas broke through Phnom Penh's last defences.

This year, the Khmer Rouge are fighting the Vietnamese, who have recently overrun their key jungle strongholds of Phnom Malai and sent tens of thousands of their civilian followers fleeing into Thailand.

The Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea at the end of 1978 and ousted the Khmer Rouge Government in January 1979.

Will 1985 bring the end of the Khmer Rouge?

Both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese seem to agree that the next phase of the Kampuchean War will shift to the interior.

The "inland front," Hanol's Deputy Defence Minister, General Le Duc Anh, wrote recently, will

be "the final place for deciding the success of the Kampuchean revolution."

Between the battles of Phnom Penh and Phnom Malai, the Khmer Rouge have left a trail of blood. Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of their countrymen were killed through starvation and execution.

The Khmer Rouge claim to have shed their ultraradical communist ideology and brutal methods. But as battles raged along the Thai-Kampuchean border, refugees who fled their ranks claimed that repression, disregard for human rights and the lives of civilians still permeated the movement.

Bold front

The Khmer Rouge and their supporters, including the Thais and Chinese, are trying to put the best possible light on the situation.

A recent communique from the three-party Kampuchean resistance, which includes the Khmer Rouge, said the present commitment of so many troops by Vietnam to the Thai-Kampuchean border presents a "golden opportunity for our resistance forces to strike deeper into the

Kampuchean interior."

Reliable Western diplomatic sources say the Khmer Rouge are indeed operating in most Kampuchean areas and this month claimed to have staged successful raids against the two key provincial capitals of western Kampuchea — Battambang and Siem Reap.

The number of casualties is not known. But even if Vietnam's claim that 5000 resistance fighters have been put out of action is correct, it stills leaves a sizable Khmer Rouge force intact. The Khmer Rouge field about 35,000 soldiers, of whom about 10,000 defended the Phnom Malai area.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who heads the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, has himself sounded an ominous note.

The coalition, of which the Khmer Rouge forms the most powerful segment, has been recognised by United Nations, which has annually called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

"They look at the battlefield also," Prince Sihanouk said in Thailand as the Vietnamese were overrunning Khmer Rouge bases. "And if it appears we have suffered heavy defeats, if it appears that we have lost our main bases, and if it appears that all our main bases have to move into Thailand rather than staying in Kampuchea, it might look bad for us in the General Assembly."

Terror

Lavy Som, an educated follower of the non-communist Khmer People's National Liber-

ation Front, which is allied with the Khmer Rouge in the coalition, says if the Khmer Rouge "return to power, they will lead Kampuchea back to hell."

His opinion is shared by virtually every non-Khmer Rouge civilian at the frontier and those interviewed by Western journalists inside Kampuchea.

Pol Pot, who held power during the reign of terror, is commander-in-chief of the Khmer Rouge Army. Ta Mok, his chief executioner, is Pol Pot's right-hand man. Today's leadership — also including Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Son Sen — is the same that was in Kampuchea before Vietnam invaded and threw the Khmer Rouge out.

Ek Chun, a former Khmer Rouge official who escaped from their camp of Klong Wah last October with 598 others, described the Khmer Rouge camps as not the murderous gulags of the 1975-78 era but nonetheless roughly disciplined, cheerless places, whose inhabitants were herded about and kept ignorant of all but Khmer Rouge orders and policies.

He said he was forbidden contact, even by mail, with his parents, who were in a Khmer People's National Liberation Front camp. Contrary to propaganda, he said, the Khmer Rouge still detested Buddhism and other religions.

The Khmer Rouge did erect a Buddhist temple in their showcase village of Phum Thmei, which has been captured by the Vietnamese.

"That was a farce," said Ek Chun. "It was built just to show off to journalists."

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

CGDK SITUATION ASSESSED IN WAKE OF SRV OFFENSIVE

Christchurch THE PRESS in English 12 Mar 85 p 18

[Text]

Until now there have been two territories calling themselves Kampuchea. There has been the Kampuchea controlled by Vietnam, and a Government recognised only by Russia and its friends. And there has been a mini-Kampuchea, consisting of a string of camps near the Thai border, whose Government is recognised in the West and has a seat in the United Nations.

As recently as February 9, the President of this Kampuchea, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was in one of his camps, Phum Thmey, throwing a champagne party for four new ambassadors accredited to his Government, from Senegal, North Korea, Bangladesh and Mauritania.

Phum Thmey and its champagne are now in Vietnamese hands, as are almost all the camps along the 600-kilometre border. After three months of often ferocious fighting the Vietnamese can now say that there is no Government but theirs on Kampuchean soil. Have the Vietnamese then at last won the war in Kampuchea, which they invaded more than six years ago?

Certainly not, according to the coalition over which Prince Sihanouk presides. Most of the 30,000 guerrillas that ran the border camps are thought to have got away into Thailand determined to continue harassing the Vietnamese. They are already claiming attacks on two Kampuchean towns, Battambang and Siem Reap. But they cannot disguise the set-back they have received by the loss of what they regarded as permanent bases in Kampuchea. The mountain stronghold of Phnom Malai, for example, held by the Khmers Rouges, one of the elements of the Sihanouk coalition, was believed by its inhabitants to be impregnable. It fell on February 15 after a few days' fighting. The Vietnamese,

who some said had gone soft, are now again acknowledged to be superb soldiers.

Not only has the fighting ability of the resistance been wanting, but many guerrillas now feel they are exiles. They talk of working in small groups behind Vietnamese lines, but probably only the Khmers Rouges would be ready to take on such an operation, in which they are already experienced. The other large group in the coalition, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, run by Mr Son Sann, a former prime minister of Kampuchea, is less mobile. Its bases, among them the long-established Amphil, which were lost in January, were run as little towns, where many guerrillas were raising families.

The third group in the coalition, Prince Sihanouk's own men, is small, and has taken little part in the fighting, although Prince Sihanouk himself has been vocal with speeches and interviews. On February 16 he appealed to China to help by invading Vietnam, as it had done briefly in early 1979. China moved some troops towards the Vietnamese border, but did little more, even though Prince Sihanouk as good as accused it of ratting on a promise to help, made when he was in Peking in October.

The retreat has also posed a problem for Thailand and its fellow members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It will now be more difficult for them to justify support for a "free" Kampuchea which holds no territory. Thailand's relationship with Vietnam has also become more tricky. Until now it was able to claim that attacks on the Vietnamese and on troops of the Phnom Penh Government were coming from within Kampuchea, and were beyond the Thais' control. If the guerrillas now operate from

within Thailand itself — and they will have, to unless they can win back some of their lost territory — that argument will be unavailable. It is likely that Vietnam will refuse to allow back into Kampuchea the 240,000 civilians who fled into Thailand from the fighting, adding to Thailand's already considerable refugee problem.

Vietnam to this extent has gained an advantage which amounts to more than just a few scraps of land. It needed a success. Diplomatically, not much had been going for it. At the United Nations general assembly last year the support for the Sihanouk resistance seemed to be intact, and, if anything, growing. Vietnam also looked nervously at moves by its protector Russia and its enemy China to patch up their long-running quarrel. One of Vietnam's nightmares is that the two communist overlords might agree to tell Vietnam to call it a day in Kampuchea and withdraw to its own border. The Vietnamese have indicated that they would consider a withdrawal only if Kampuchea were left in friendly hands. They invaded the country to get rid of Pol Pot's murderous Khmer Rouge Government, and are unlikely to sit down at a conference table with ASEAN countries or anybody else until the west refuses to have any dealings with Pol Pot and his men.

The Vietnamese may now be hoping that the Thais at any rate may be ready to meet this condition, supported perhaps by Prince Sihanouk, some of whose close relatives were murdered by the Khmer Rouge Government. The resistance will presumably try to persuade the Thais that they will return to Kampuchea in force when the Vietnam operation is suspended at the end of the dry season. The Thais will need a lot of convincing. The story of the "two Kampucheas" looks increasingly like fiction.

CSO: 4200/829

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

RESISTANCE INVOLVEMENT IN GEM SMUGGLING

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 5 Feb 85 p 5

[Text]

BORAI, Trat — Thousands of adventurous Thais, risking booby traps and gunfire from Vietnamese troops, have crossed into war-torn Kampuchea to dig for new gem deposits.

Many have lost their legs, after stepping on booby traps planted by Vietnamese soldiers. Others have been struck down with malaria while several of them were taken by Vietnamese troops as "prisoners-of-war" to work on the construction of a strategic road on the Thai-Kampuchean border, marked by the rugged Bantad Range.

The gem centre of Thailand in Borai has dried up and the once well-known "Red Gem" or "Siamese Ruby" are getting scarce here. The determination to search for a new gem mine across the border has begun with a vengeance.

The earnest search began about two years ago, according to an old-timer here. "It started when the new gem-diggers came in large numbers but couldn't find new mines to dig for gems. Old ones had all been taken up and no concessions were hard to come by since the military had cordoned off three kilometres along the border for national defence. Besides, the Mons and Burmese who had sneaked into Kanchanaburi had also moved here to search for the precious stones..."

The desperate search for new gem mines across the border then began in earnest, with one estimate suggesting that about 10,000

Thais have crossed over through the Pa-a Pass into areas in Pailin, namely O-chang, O-sariel, Nasadom, Nasati and Bolang.

It's no easy trek which usually takes half a day before arriving at "Khao Petch" which has become the best-known gem-digging area, about seven kilometres from the Thai border.

The first part of the trip from Baan Pa-a could be covered by car after which the gem-diggers have to go on foot through Tamad and Pongsi Passes. "They are equipped with some basic tools for manual digging and food supplies in the knapsacks," said another well-informed local villager.

"At first, they went individually. But later on, things began to be developed into a larger scale and investors with money would hire mining workers to cross over in groups. Meanwhile, a new kind of occupation surfaced. Some people were hired to carry oil tanks or buckets to fuel the mining pumps. The fee is 500 baht for each 30-litre fuel tank.

One investor told *The Nation* here over the weekend: "The investment in mining across the border isn't all that good a venture. In fact, it could involve some losses. But we hope to get some gold as a side business. And that's what keeps us going."

The businessman in Borai said that the site of the gem mines was a stronghold of Khmer resistance forces who demand medicines and food in return for permission to

dig for gems there.

"The Khmer fighters drew the lines for us to do the gem mining but some workers went off the area and were hurt by planted booby traps," he said.

Han, a Mon, for example, lost his right leg when he stepped on booby traps and was sent to Chantaburi province for treatment. He was later fitted with a plastic leg. Recalling his experience, he said: "I went in the dark with about 13 other people. I was the ninth in the group. But I was unlucky. I stepped on a booby trap and was sent back to the hospital in Chantaburi. My friends went ahead to dig for gems. But I haven't got any yet."

Dr Voravit Vorapatrakul, director of Borai Hospital, said about 20 people had so far been treated there after they were hurt in booby traps in January, this year, alone. So far, 67 persons have been given artificial legs and Operation Handicap International (OHI), an international organization, has set up a centre here to help the poor.

"We may be able to offer the service free in the near future although at the moment we are charging 300-500 baht per artificial leg," he said.

Dr Voravit said that a large number of the "adventurers" who had gone fortune-hunting in Kampuchea suffered from acute malaria.

"Despite the existence of an anti-malaria centre here, we have been swamped by the large number of malaria patients - 2,000 out of 20,000 have sought treatment here. The hospital is jammed and many have to sleep on the corridors since there aren't enough beds. The strong malaria disease contracted in Kampuchea is immune to the medicines available here. Some have died. We have, however, experi-

mented with some new medicines that could cope with the disease," he said.

Military sources here said that some Thais who had fled from Pailin reported that during a recent attack on O-Sariel near the gem site, about 1,000 Thai fortune-seekers were rounded up and were sent to Battambang after which they were sent to Pailin to work on a road construction project.

BOI PLOI: WHERE ADVENTURES MEET:

Boi Ploi in Borai District of Trat province, has been in the doldrums due to the decline in gem findings. But transactions of gems continue every morning after which buyers would re-sell their precious stones to Chantaburi province. From there, they are sold around the country.

About 30% of the buyers are from Tak near the Burmese border while most workers in the mines here are from the North-east. "Actually, only about 10 per cent of the gem traders you see here are local people," a villager here said.

Officially, the registered population of Borai District shows only 28,000. But unofficial figures indicate that at least 50,000 people take up residence here. As a result, the incidence of crime tends to be high. "Some sneaked across the border to Kampuchea and others fled elsewhere following conflicts over gem transactions," a local official said.

During 1979-1981, the place might have been termed the "Wild, Wild East." An average of 40 persons were killed a month then. The gunmen have since fled the place, which has gone through a solemn and quiet period due to the drop in gem deposits.

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

PRK REACTION TO SIHANOUK, GRADUAL DEPARTURE OF SRV CADRE

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 1 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Michael Vickery]

[Text]

“We just aren't giving attention to the Sihanouk period at the moment,” answered the teacher of a Year 7 politics course in a Phnom Penh high school. I had been intrigued by the syllabus, which jumped from The Struggle against French Colonialism to that against American Imperialism and the Traitorous Lon Nol Clique with no reference to the intervening 16 years (1954-1970) when Sihanouk ran Kampuchea.

This is astonishing since the people who now lead the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), whether old revolutionaries or the technocrats who comprise the second level of leadership, have good reason to reject Sihanouk. They must find ironic his call for internationally-supervised free elections, since a previous exercise of this kind, undertaken under Sihanouk in 1955, proved fraudulent. One would expect, in PRK textbooks, to find a lesson on The Struggle against Sihanouk's Reactionary Regime.

But throughout my month-long stay I observed a marked decrease in anti-Sihanouk propaganda in comparison to the situation a few years ago and this gives some support to the view that the PRK would like to draw Sihanouk away from the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) coalition-in-exile and bring him back to Phnom Penh as an honoured, if politically impotent, senior citizen.

This tactic is less for any domestic legitimacy which Sihanouk might lend the PRK than for his international prestige. Well over half the Kampuchean population are too young to have any memory of Sihanouk's rule and have grown up on a diet of anti-Sihan-

ouk propaganda under Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and at first the PRK.

The rather pluralistic composition of the PRK could easily find a niche to accommodate Sihanouk. Among the perhaps only 1,000-strong Communist Party members who staff most of the highest posts there are two recognisable factions — those who spent 1954-1970 in Vietnam and the pre-1978 Pol Pot cadres without such Vietnamese experience. There are also two powerful individuals who did not go to Vietnam, who split with Pol Pot before 1975, and who are moreover non-Khmer: Bou Thang, the Minister of Defence and member of a small ethnic minority, and Say Phouthang, an ethnic Thai who heads the key Organisation Committee of the Party.

There are also hundreds of PRK administrators, technicians and intellectuals who once served Sihanouk and Lon Nol including four ministers — Education, Health, Agriculture, and Information and Culture. Many of this group have definite anti-communist pasts, which are known, including one who was trained by and worked for US and South Vietnamese intelligence during the 1970-75 war.

In Phnom Penh, Sihanouk would also find a female cousin who is a deputy general secretary of a State executive organ, the Solidarity Front for Construction and Defence of the Nation, and Mrs Phlek Pirun, a pillar of Phnom Penh society in the 1960s who now, as then, is president of the Kampuchean Red Cross.

These cadres and State employees of such disparate background have shown unexpected solidarity in organising the

recovery of Kampuchea since 1979 and there has been palpable yearly progress, even if slowed by frightening deficiencies in trained personnel, essential supplies and finance, and by an international campaign to impede the recovery.

A PRK Khmer administration has been implanted throughout the country, enabling Vietnamese advisers and experts, mostly essential technicians, to gradually withdraw. In their relations with authority the Khmer population now deals with Khmer officials. A Vietnamese presence seems minimal, except in the north and north-west where defence against infiltration from the Thai border is still largely undertaken by the Vietnamese Army.

The most salient foreign presence in Phnom Penh is Russian, and the reasons are easy to see. The Soviet Union has been the main provider of redevelopment aid. The Soviet Technical Institute has taken up the work it began under Sihanouk in the 1960s, and the 84 Soviet teachers there are developing a significant segment of Kampuchea's future technical elite.

THE Vietnamese presence in Phnom Penh, in contrast, is much less evident than three years ago, although it is certain that there are more Vietnamese civilians, in particular pre-war residents, often natives, who have returned home but are more assimilated, thus less noticeable, than in 1981.

In spite of Kampuchea's dependence on foreign aid and expertise in the first years after 1979, cultural revival is resolutely Khmer.

One of the most important aspects of this after the Pol Pot experience has been the revival of Buddhism. Temples have been reopened and repaired, monks ordained, and traditional festivals are again organised.

Education has also been revived after the bleak Pol Pot years and the schools are more thoroughly Khmer than at any time in the past century. In the 10-year primary and secondary school syllabus much time is devoted to Khmer language and literature, and no foreign language instruction had yet been introduced.

Although English and French are not in the school syllabus, their importance is recognised and in all neighbourhoods of the capital private English courses flourish under teachers who for a few hours each evening are able to earn several times their State salaries.

Even though State salaries, now 140-500 riels a month, have since 1981 risen more than the prices of most basic commodities, no-one considers that it is possible to exist on salary alone.

The economically advantaged groups in Kampuchea today are the free-market traders, independent artisans, and farmers in the better agricultural areas. Taxes, termed "patriotic contributions", were finally introduced in 1983 and affect traders, private artisans, farmers and semi-private concerns such as restaurants.

The otherwise optimistic picture is marred by the necessity to divert enormous resources to national defence, and this means low incomes, slow economic growth, strict security measures, and mobilisation of the population for onerous tasks. These are recruitment for an expanding army to fight beside and eventually replace the Vietnamese as well as the draft of civilians to build roads and clear security zones near the Thai border.

There is little else the Government can do so long as their enemies' well-endowed backers, China, ASEAN, and the US, keep upping the ante. Thus multi-party negotiations to end the conflict are essential, but it would be unrealistic to expect that the PRK could be displaced.

CSO: 4200/819

7 May 1985

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

TERRORISM, BORDER FORTIFICATION, VIETNAMESE IN PRK

PM190810 Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Apr 85 pp 1, 2; 19 Apr p 7

[James Burnett dispatch: "The Haunting Memory of Terror"]

[17 Apr 85 pp 1, 2]

[Text] Phnom Penh--Right in the heart of the city the O Russei market, where the spices smell even stronger in the humid heat which precedes the rainy season, is as busy as usual, as is the old covered market, not far from there, which was one of targets of the Khmers Rouges' deadly rockets before the final assault of 17 April 1975. At 1400 hours tragedy struck. A grenade exploded near stalls reserved for gold and jewelry dealers. The security militia fired a few rounds into the air. These are scenes which were all too familiar in Phnom Penh during the war. The witnesses, particularly some Czechoslovak experts, said they had seen four people killed and three injured. This toll has not been officially confirmed.

Have the perpetrator of perpretrators of the attack been arrested? Who are they? These are unanswered questions. Three versions spread quickly in Phnom Penh: "Enemy infiltration"; the desperate action of a Khmer soldier who lost a leg in the explosion of a mine on the Khmer-Thai border; "Vietnamese thieves" attracted by the gold "trinkets." People maintain that this is not the first such incident on this market, in which most of the small dealers are Vietnamese.

Two days later in Odonk, a small town in Kompong Chhnang Province 30km north of Phnom Penh, a group of guerrillas burst into the market late in the afternoon. Shots were fired. The toll was around 15 people killed, including a Vietnamese officer. This raid was confirmed by diplomatic sources in Phnom Penh without further details being given about the number of people killed.

Security is the Cambodian authorities' main problem a few days before the 10th anniversary of 17 April. It is an anniversary which will be quietly celebrated by Heng Samrin's regime. History is cruel for the new leaders: This date marks "the victory over American imperialism." It also marks the start of the Khmer rouge nightmare which followed 5 years of a particularly savage war.

Mr Hun Sen, prime minister and foreign minister of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, may say that the whole country is "under control," but the situation

is complex. Official Khmer and Vietnamese sources admit that the forthcoming rainy season, which begins at the end of April, will be a "decisive test" for the regime after the successes against the resistance bases on the Thai border. Phnom Penh admits that "kicking over the anthill" has not solved all the problems. Far from it.

The aim is now to neutralize the many groups of guerrillas scattered around the countryside. It is an arduous task, which under the new plan of action falls to the 30,000-strong young Phnom Penh army trained by the Vietnamese. It will be especially difficult because "the enemy has suffered a cruel blow and may hit out blindly." And it is known that there is a real danger. Last September the guerrillas wreaked veritable carnage in a bayonet attack on the Phnom Penh-Battambang train. Some 50 passengers were killed and several dozen injured, some of whom were taken to hospital in Phnom Penh. That is how people found out about the raid.

As 17 April approaches, the threat of "an enemy thrust" toward Phnom Penh is being taken seriously. The Vietnamese advisers are stepping up their orders on security to the Cambodian authorities. The surveillance measures in the capital's markets and the checks made after curfew, which has been in force from 2100 hours to 0500 hours for 6 years, have been stepped up. According to Khmer sources, an increasing number of people have been questioned in Phnom Penh and several networks have been dismantled in recent weeks. Westerners are being discreetly discouraged from frequenting the markets. In a recent meeting with representatives of humanitarian organizations Mr Hun Sen expressed his fears about one of them being killed or taken hostage. The 2,000 or so Soviet experts only travel by helicopter in the provinces. As for the journalists present in Phnom Penh in the past few weeks, they have only been allowed short visits to the provinces adjacent to the capital because of "mopping up operations."

"Day of Evidence"

However, the Cambodian authorities and Vietnamese advisers are keeping cool and even show a strong optimism which may cause surprise. Phnom Penh is now counting on the guerrillas becoming exhausted after the "sealing" of the border. According to Vietnamese sources the offensive against the resistance bases is beginning to bear fruit. "The number of attacks is down on last year," a Vietnamese expert said. "But we must admit that their attacks may be more spectacular and dangerous. In addition the number of guerrilla groups is falling. They seem to have decided to regroup their members before carrying out hit and run operations. This makes the task easier because we can detect them more easily. Finally, we have succeeded in observing that the Khmers Rouges are no longer so efficient and aggressive in clashes. Although the rainy season is generally favorable to the guerrillas," he added, "things could be different. They no longer have any rear base, and it will be more difficult for them to reach Thailand because of the defense installations being constructed on the border. We think that their morale will be sorely tried over the months. And the rainy season will be particularly difficult for the guerrillas this year."

In the final analysis great hopes are being placed on "undermining" "the enemy's" morale to speed up the pacification of Cambodia. Furthermore Heng Samrin's administration has shown some skill in giving priority to his "policy of clemency" in his propaganda broadcasts. The government is trying to play on the sometimes unusual nature of the family relationships between the guerrillas and the local populations. The example of women going into the jungle to persuade a husband or brother to lay down his arms and return to their village is frequently quoted. Nonetheless these "strays who have returned" have to spend several months in "reeducation centres," like the one which is reported to exist 3km from Stoeng Trng in the northeast, before returning to normal life.

This policy of "clemency" undoubtedly has the population's support. They have not forgotten the tragic odyssey of the general evacuation of cities on 17 April 1975, not to mention the odysseys made under Khmer route control well before that date, and the physical and mental cruelty inflicted by the men in black pajamas. The father who runs the main orphanage in Phnom Penh was "scarred for life" by the "execution" of two young children who were thrown by their feet against a tree by two drunken Khmers Rouges who then disemboweled their mother alive. And a young Foreign Ministry official is still in a state of shock from the disappearance of her family and the forced marriage from which she narrowly escaped by invoking her "lack" of political maturity to accept such a mark of confidence from Angkar" (the Khmer Rouge political organization).

The hypothesis of Pol Pot returning to power terrifies the Cambodians. And, to keep the memory of his crimes alive, the Phnom Penh authorities have turned 20 May into a "day of evidence" on "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique." "This commemoration is not inconsistent with our policy of clemency," an official explained. "We must draw a distinction between the two leaders and the others who were morally forced to carry out orders to save their own lives. This black page in Cambodia's history is unlike anything you have experienced in Europe. They must be given a chance to return to a normal life. This is the only way that there can be reconciliation among the Cambodian people," he added. At what price and how soon?

[19 Apr 85 p 7]

[James Burnett dispatch: "In Sihanouk's Time There Was Peace"]

[Text] Phnom Penh--The young employee from the White Hotel was proud of his new acquisition, a small scarlet Honda Motorcycle. "My parents hid some gold before the Khmers Rouges arrived," he explained. "Fortunately I was able to find it again." This machine, smuggled in by boat from Thailand, was sold on the black market in Phnom Penh for \$1,500, with all the papers in order. "There is no problem with the authorities, who tolerate this kind of trade," he added. Dozens of people travel round on these small motorcycles. The streets of Phnom Penh are no longer the preserve of pedestrians as they were 4 years ago. Traffic regulations are back in force. Bicycles and mopeds predominate, but cars are returning in force. It comes as a great surprise to see a Jaguar, a Mercedes 180 coupe, a Citroen DS, and big American cars--all vehicles abandoned 10 years ago which have been restored by their "new owners."

In 6 years Phnom Penh has gone from its death throes to a virtually normal life, despite serious infrastructure problems--water and electricity shortages in particular--which are curbing its development. This city of around 450,000 inhabitants has found its soul again. Essential products abound on the markets. Stores--antiques stores, hairdressers, tailors--have reopened. Private or mixed ownership restaurants and cinemas are successful. In short life in Phnom Penh is better than in Ho Chi Minh City, and especially than in Hanoi.

But Phnom Penh can give a distorted picture of Cambodia. This year the authorities will once again have to appeal for international aid to meet the rice needs of the 7.1 million inhabitants, according to official statistics. Last year's deplorable climatic conditions--drought followed by disastrous floods--swept aside the government plan. The last harvest will barely reach 600,000 metric tons of rice from a sown area of 830,000 hectares. "This is the worst result in the past 4 years," according to Mr Kong Thai Pouthan, the agriculture minister's secretary. "We would have to double our production if we want to envisage self-sufficiency." This shortfall could recur next year after the destruction of floating rice seed by the floods. This analysis is supported by a Western experts, especially since the international market has no stock of this seed.

"Pol Pot's legacy is terrible. We are completely at the mercy of the elements," this Western-educated top Cambodian civil servant added. "We lack fertilizer, insecticide, pesticide, and beasts of burden. Fishing was one of Cambodia's resources. Current production--60,000 metric tons of fish--is still only half what was fished in 1970."

Mr Pouthan expects it to take at least 15 years to restore the whole of the irrigation system. The first agricultural technicians to graduate will be operational in 5 years' time. This observation of importance can be extended to the country's whole economy. A Soviet trade delegation on a fact-finding mission left without any plans for real trade in the near future.

But the "Pol Pot legacy" is not enough to explain this situation. The Cambodians have been on the defensive since the Khmer Rouge regime. "They want to know where they are going," a representative of a humanitarian organization commented. They find it very difficult to accept the bureaucratic yoke which is gradually being established. The repetition of political courses and manual labor sessions for all civil servants is producing a feeling of disquiet. "The Cambodians do the minimum to avoid criticism," this Western expert added. "Above all the Cambodians want to go unnoticed, and in fact they no longer know where their future lies."

This feeling of uncertainty was further accentuated in September when the authorities announced their plan for "homeland defense" work--especially road building and the construction of protective ditches--on the Cambodian-Thai border to contain infiltration by underground fighters at known crossing points in Battambang, Pailin, and Koh Kong provinces. The return to these inhospitable areas after the forced moves under the Khmers Rouges was preceded by a campaign of explanation by the authorities to allay fears. But the price to pay for these civilians is higher than propaganda suggested.

There were fatal accidents as a result of the explosion of mines and shells, official sources admit. But, what is even more serious, the movement of people in these malaria-infested areas brings a danger of a malaria epidemic. "Cambodia is in a state of emergency," a doctor stressed. According to representatives of the humanitarian organizations, 60 percent of the "volunteers" are infected with malaria and 50 percent of them have falciparum malaria--the most pernicious form. These estimates seem to be falling as a result of stepping up prophylactic measures. Nonetheless Cambodia does not have the means to cope with this situation. Stocks of quinine, which were already very inadequate, have been completely exhausted. The Eastern bloc countries cannot give any emergency aid because they have no quinine. It would take 20 million tablets to avoid the worst.

[Cambodian foreign minister] Hun Sen met with representatives of the humanitarian organizations in early January to inform them of the situation, of which they had already learned through different channels. Cambodia has already received a gift of 5 million tablets. Deputy Health Minister Nouth Savoen rules out the danger of an epidemic for the time being. But, he added, "it could spread like wildfire" if the work continues during the rainy season. According to a well-informed source in Phnom Penh more people are due to leave for the border, mainly cadres, for an exceptionally long period of 6 months. It would be wise for departures to at least be suspended. But the Phnom Penh administration is convinced that its decisions are right. "Since the Cambodian people are master of their destiny and are aware of their task and their duty as citizens, they fully understand the danger posed by the threat of Pol Pot returning," a Foreign Ministry cadre stated.

A more judicious explanation was given by a top Health Ministry civil servant. "We have our honor, and our Vietnamese friends will have to leave Cambodia some day. We must guarantee our defense. This is the reason for this decision to start this work." Could the Vietnamese really be planning to leave Cambodia?

Do 6 years of Vietnamese presence have more disadvantages than advantages? Many Cambodians admit that Hanoi's Vietnamese troops are still a rampart against Pol Pot's return. But there is real anxiety about the prolonged presence of Vietnamese soldiers on Cambodian territory. The Vietnamese officials are aware of the way in which the Cambodian population's thinking is developing. This is one of the main reasons for the Vietnamese army's discretion in Phnom Penh. Vietnamese sources admit that undisciplined action by young soldiers have sparked off limited incidents between Cambodians and Vietnamese soldiers.

As for the process of Vietnamization, it is difficult to have an accurate idea of it. The Cambodians themselves think the figure of 500,000 people put forward by the resistance as the size of the Vietnamese community is an exaggeration. The Cambodian authorities stick to the figure of 60,000 people. Outside Phnom Penh the Cambodians say they are witnessing the return of families who left Cambodia before 1975. They say it is no more than that. The policy of distributing land to the Vietnamese is not clear. On the other hand, people who recently visited Svay Rieng Province, which borders on Vietnam, noted that the Phnom Penh authorities were installing Cambodian families on abandoned land. On the other hand there is reason to question the appropriateness of making

Vietnamese compulsory in the first year of medical studies when the Vietnamese teachers use French.

"Our country has not had any luck. But perhaps everything will return to normal one day." This remark by a young Cambodian woman is not an isolated one. But when asked the reason for this a brooding silence returned. Some people cautiously put forward Sihanouk's name. "I am neither in favor of nor opposed to Sihanouk's return," an official, who was anxious to remain anonymous, stated. "But if his return is to be a precondition for the end of the war, for a Vietnamese withdrawal, and for national reconciliation, then I am in favor of it. We must end this war. The Cambodians to agree among themselves."

It is true that Sihanouk's alliance with Pol Pot surprises the Cambodians and, in some cases, disappoints them. "Sihanouk should return," one storekeeper said. "But on one condition, he must leave Pol Pot. Sihanouk must fulfill this condition. If he does not, he cannot return." This is the precondition put forward by the Phnom Penh government for Sihanouk's return. It is mere coincidence or the result of propaganda? The fervor which could be seen on people's faces on a Sunday visit to the throne room in the royal palace, open to the public since 1981, undoubtedly bears witness to the Cambodians' attachment to the former king. "In Sihanouk's time there was peace," one visitor stressed. "After that there was war and death."

CSO: 4219/47

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

VIETNAMESE, CAMBODIAN PROVINCES DEVELOP TIES

OW151437 Hanoi VNA in English 0717 GMT 15 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, 15 Apr (VNA)--Vietnam's central province of Quang Nam-Da Nang has for half a dozen years now effectively assisted Kampuchea's Battambang Province with which it had established sisterhood in 1979.

Battambang, situated 1,600 kilometers from Da Nang, has nearly 300 kilometers of common border with Thailand.

When Battambang was faced with difficulties left behind by the genocidal Pol Pot regime, Quang Nam-Da Nang sent it emergency aid, including rice, household utensils, clothes, farm tools, school materials and 25 medical experts.

Quang Nam-Da Nang also sent high-yield rice varieties to Battambang people who subsequently turned out more than 300,000 tons of paddy in 1984 as against none after liberation, with a per capital average of 447 kilograms. Also last year Battambang sold the state 170,000 tons of food.

Quang Nam-Da Nang has restored and equipped for its twin province a farm tools factory and a veterinary station, and opened refresher courses on intensive farming for a number of managing cadres.

Battambang's irrigation system heavily damaged by the Polpotists has been partly repaired, bringing water to 80,000 hectares of tilled land. The Quang Nam-Da Nang hydraulic service helped in the survey and designing of the Kampingpoi reservoir, 32 km long and 14 km wide, and capable of watering 30,500 hectares.

Quang Nam-Da Nang has closely cooperated with Battambang Province in training 119 junior high school teachers of natural sciences, making it possible to receive 5,000 more students annually.

The Da Nang hospital opened refresher courses on x-ray, ear-nose-throat, obstetrics, pediatrics and other subjects for Battambang's medical personnel. To help develop traditional medicine, Quang Nam-Da Nang has trained a number of personnel for Battambang Province and supplied it with medical facilities.

With assistance from Quang Nam-Da Nang's radio station, Battambang's wire-broadcasting system was widened down to districts. The restoration of the water station in Battambang has made an important contribution to the sanitary and prophylactic work there.

The achievements recorded by the twin provinces over the past years, especially in 1984, were exalted by Kong Sanul, vice chairman of the Battambang People's Revolutionary Committee, as a concrete manifestation of the militant solidarity, friendship and comprehensive cooperation between Quang Nam-Da Nang and Battambang in particular and between Vietnam and Kampuchea as a whole.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

ARMY PAPER ON SINO-JAPANESE 'MILITARY COLLUSION'

BK151700 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 15 Apr 85

[Text] The Hanoi army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on Monday ran a commentary on the Sino-Japanese military collusion. The daily quoted the Japanese paper AKAHATA and the Tokyo TIMES as reporting that on 10 April, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Song Zhiguang met (Gato), head of the Japanese Defense Agency, to invite the deputy head of this agency, Mr (Nasume), to visit China for promoting the Sino-Japanese military collusion. The following day, on 11 April, Director of the Chinese Institute of International Strategy Research (Liu Qiguang), in an interview with the Japanese news agency NHK, point-blank said China and Japan should increase military exchange. (Liu Qiguang) expressed the hope that the coming visit to China by (Nasume) would open up a surge in the exchange of military personnel between the two countries.

To play down possible protests from world public opinion, especially in China and other Asian countries, (Liu Qiguang) explained that since the establishment of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties, bilateral relations have been promoted in various domains, and there is no reason why their military relations must be an exception. But things are not as simple as explained by (Liu Qiguang) and the Beijing leadership. Since Deng Xiaoping's statement that China volunteers to become a NATO member in the East, public opinion has become very worried on every move taken by China toward that target. With time, it is more and more obvious that China has been stepping up its strategic cooperation with the United States and Japan in many fields, including the military, forming in practice an evil tripartite military alliance.

In 1983 and 1984, reciprocal visits and meetings were made by U.S. and Chinese brass hats to strengthen the military collusion between the two countries. Latest of these developments is the newly agreed program of U.S. arms sale to help China modernize its navy and the announcement that three U.S. warships will soon call at Shanghai Port. The Sino-American military collusion serves as the motive force to promote the Sino-Japanese military relations.

For all sophistry, the Beijing leadership will never be able to gloat over its sinister scheme in colluding militarily with the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese militarists--two archenemies of the Chinese and other Asian peoples. This has further exposed the extremely reactionary and traitorous nature of

Beijing. It is necessary to note that the military collusion between Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo has not the least possible impact. On the contrary, it is a danger to peace and stability in Asia, especially in South and Southeast Asia. This tripartite military collusion has been promoted by the similarity in diplomacy of its members. While Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing are sharing many points of view and coordinating in a frantic effort to oppose the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the revolutionary and national independence movement to threaten the security of the nations in Asia, they have been providing arms for the rebels and reactionaries to oppose the revolutionary, progressive, and socialist forces. They have been pursuing similar hostile policies toward the Indochinese and other developing countries, resorting to all possible means to slander the Soviet Union and Vietnam and to disrupt the trend for dialogue to build Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, friendship, and cooperation.

China is also cooperating with the United States in the field of military intelligence targeted on its neighbors and approves the process of rearmament and militarization in Japan. China has become dependent on U.S. and Japanese support to carry out its program of military modernization in service of its hegemonist and expansionist ambition.

The U.S., Japanese and Chinese military collusion has caused a great concern among almost all Asian nations and even among their allies. The increased Sino-Japanese military cooperation is also an undeniable proof of the betrayal by the Beijing authorities toward their own people who never forget the barbarous crimes committed by the Japanese fascists in mainland China during World War II. This is an insult to the souls of the Chinese revolutionaries and patriots who had laid down their lives in the fight against Japanese militarism. The collusion of China, Japan, and the United States is simply the product of the regrouping of the imperialists and international reactionary forces who are suffering from repeated failures and serious weakening. However, they cannot reverse the development of the revolution and peace in Asia and the rest of the world. All their moves will certainly be drowned in the surging revolutionary tides of the peoples in Asia for peace, national independence, and social progress.

CSO: 4200/794

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

LENIN'S BIRTHDAY MARKED BY VARIOUS ACTIVITIES

OW221143 Hanoi VNA in English 0924 GMT 22 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, VNA, April 22--A seething labour emulation drive has been launched by Soviet experts and Vietnamese workers at the construction site of the Hoa Binh hydro-electric plant in honour of great Lenin's 115th birthday and the 10th anniversary of South Vietnam's liberation.

In this drive, every day they removed almost 18,000 cubic metres of earth and rock, thus helping raise the lower part of the main dam to 66 metres, six metres higher than the dam they built last year.

On this occasion, 20,000 Soviet experts and Vietnamese workers at the site participated in a communist labour day to raise funds for activities to anticipate the 12th world youth and student festival.

Communist labour was held on Sunday, April 21 at the construction sites of Lenin's Monument in Chi Lang Park and the Culture Palace in Hanoi in celebration of Lenin's birthday.

Many local leading officials, representatives of the embassies of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries here, and Hanoians took part in the work.

On the same day, about 400 Soviet specialists and Vietnamese workers at the central coastal port of Da Nang participated in a communist labour drive to mark this historical event.

CSO: 4200/833

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

LENIN'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATED IN HO CHI MINH CITY

OW231957 Hanoi VNA in English 1504 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, VNA, April 23--A big mass meeting was jointly held in Ho Chi Minh City last night by the city's party committee, people's committee and fatherland front committee and the city chapter of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with Other Peoples, in celebration of V.I. Lenin's 115th birthday (April 22).

It was attended by Nguyen Van Linh, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and secretary of the city party committee; and O.A. Volkov, Soviet consul-general.

Many other activities were also arranged on this occasion by the city chapter of the Vietnam-U.S.S.R. Friendship Association, highlighting Lenin's great revolutionary cause.

In Quang Nam-Danang Province (Central Vietnam) today, the local culture and information service and Vietnam-U.S.S.R. Friendship Association chapter opened a photo exhibition on Lenin's revolutionary cause; and the Ho Chi Minh Museum, the fifth military zone command, the Central Lenin Museum and the Soviet News Agency T.A.S.S. jointly opened another exhibition on the Leninist peace foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4200/833

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

REPORT ON SYRIAN NATIONAL DAY

State Leaders Greetings

OW161606 Hanoi VNA in English 1527 GMT 16 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, 16 Apr (VNA)--Vietnamese President of State Council Truong Chinh and chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong today sent their warmest greetings to President Hafiz al-Asad and Prime Minister 'Abd al-Raiuf al-Kasm of the Syrian Arab Republic on the 39th national day of the republic (17 April).

The Vietnamese leaders said in a joint message: "Over the past years, the Syrian people under the leadership of the Syrian Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the government of the Syrian Arab Republic headed by President Hafiz al-Asad, have recorded many great achievements in the struggle to defend their national independence and build their country into a prosperous one. The Vietnamese people greatly rejoice at those successes and sincerely wish the Syrian people many new and greater achievements in their glorious cause, thus contributing to Arab people's struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

"May the militant solidarity, the friendship and cooperation between the Vietnamese and Syrian peoples constantly consolidate and develop."

On this occasion, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach also sent a message of greetings to his Syrian counterpart Faruq al-Shar'.

Talk Marks Celebration

OW161610 Hanoi VNA in English 1548 GMT 16 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, 16 Apr (VNA)--A talk was held here today by the Vietnam-Syria Friendship Association marking the 39th national day of the Syrian Arab Republic. Among those present were Ha Ke Tan, president of the Vietnam-Syria Friendship Association; Trinh Ngoc Thai, secretary general of the Committee for Solidarity and Friendship With Other Peoples; and representatives of various public offices and organizations in Hanoi.

Le Bach, vice president of the sponsoring association, brought out the great achievements recorded by the Syrian people in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and Israeli aggressors to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. On this occasion, the association has sent a message of greetings to its Syrian counterpart.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

STATEMENT TERMED 'DECEPTION'--During his visit to New Zealand, Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CPC, said that China has no intention to play a military role in the region and that China will reduce its army within 2 years. Hu Yaobang's statement is considered a deception by diplomatic circles and the world public as China is concentrating efforts on army modernization and dreaming to become a superpower in the region and the world. China's military budget is on the rise. It is trying to buy more weapons and military technology from the United States and the West. Beijing is inviting military advisers of these countries to visit China. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 22 Apr 85]

UK RECEPTION--Hanoi, VNA, 22 Apr--A reception was given here today by Michael Wood, charge d'affaires a.i. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in honour of Queen Elizabeth II's birthday. Present at the reception were Le Khac, foreign trade minister; Vo Van Sung, assistant to the foreign minister and many others. Members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of international organizations here were also present. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1526 GMT 22 Apr 85]

EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION WITH FRANCE--Hanoi, 22 Apr--Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Education Tran Xuan Nhi and French Ambassador to Vietnam Ivan Bastouil today signed a protocol providing for the operation of the French-language department of the Hanoi Foreign Languages Teachers Training College. The signing was witnessed by Vietnamese Minister of Education Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh. Under this protocol the department's multifunction activities will be promoted. The French will also provide the department with equipment in service of its activities. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1536 GMT 22 Apr 85]

CANADIAN COMMUNIST LEADER--Hanoi, 16 Apr (VNA)--General secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Le Duan has sent a message of congratulations to William Kashtan on his re-election as secretary general of the Communist Party of Canada. In his message, General Secretary Le Duan wishes Secretary General William Kashtan good health so as to, together with the CPC Central Committee, successfully carry out their noble missions. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1526 GMT 16 Apr 85]

7 May 1985

CZECHOSLOVAKIA NATIONAL DAY--Hanoi, 16 Apr (VNA)--An exhibition entitled "For Freedom and Socialism" was opened here today under the joint auspice of the Vietnam revolutionary museum and the Klement Gottwald Museum of Czechoslovakia in anticipation of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Red Army (9 May 1945). Attending the opening ceremony were Nong Quoc Chan, vice-minister of culture; Tran Van Hai, director of the Vietnam revolutionary museum; representatives of the International Department of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry and of various public offices and mass organizations in Hanoi; and a number of veteran revolutionaries. Czechoslovak Ambassador Bohuslav Handl and other members of the Czechoslovak Embassy here were also present. With hundreds of photos on display, the exhibition brought out the revolutionary struggle of the Czechoslovak people and army who had stood side by side with the Soviet Red Army in the fight against Hitler fascism. A large section of the exhibition was reserved for the time-honoured friendship, militant solidarity and fraternal cooperation between the two countries, which have been further strengthened especially since the signing of the Czechoslovakia-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation more than 5 years ago. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1550 GMT 16 Apr 85]

CSO: 4200/794

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VAN TIEN DUNG ADDRESS AT UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM

OW151129 Hanoi VNA in English 0739 GMT 15 Apr 85

["VNA Supplement--The Great 1975 Spring Victory and Some Strategic Issues in the Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation Address of General Van Tien Dung, Political Bureau Member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and Minister of National Defence, at a Recent Symposium in Ho Chi Minh City on the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising"--VNA headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received]--The great 1975 spring victory and some strategic issues in the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation

Address of General Van Tien Dung, Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and minister of national defence, at a recent symposium in Ho Chi Minh City on the 1975 spring general offensive and uprising.

Ten years ago, in the spring of 1975, another extremely great exploit was written down in the Vietnamese nation's history, which greatly rejoiced the entire Vietnamese people and our brothers and friends in all continents. In a swift strategic battle combining military attacks with political uprising lasting for 53 consecutive days, our army and people completely defeated the U.S. imperialists' aggressive war and shattered their neo-colonialist rule, completely liberated the south and brought to a glorious end the longest, most difficult and greatest patriotic war in our nation's history.

The world people witnessed an unheard-of event: a small, economically poor and backward country defeated on the battlefield the biggest, richest and strongest imperialist power in the world, the international gendarme and the most dangerous and cruel enemy of progressive mankind.

For our people, that glorious victory marked a great turning point in the nation's history and ushered in an era full of bright prospects for our homeland.

For the world people, our people's great victory has contributed to weakening the imperialist system while increasing the strength and offensive posture of the revolutionary currents of our time.

Militarily, the complete victory of our anti-U.S. resistance war culminating in the 1975 spring general offensive and uprising marked a glorious development of Vietnam's military art and science in modern times, and further enriched the military theory of Marxism-Leninism.

The commemoration of this great festive day coincides with the 95th birthday of the Great President Ho Chi Minh (May 19). With boundless gratitude, our people and armed forces remember the great services done to the country by Uncle Ho, the great leader of our party, the eminent teacher of the Vietnamese revolution and an outstanding hero of the nation who had the first merit in every victory of the Vietnamese revolution. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee headed by Comrade General Secretary Le Duan, we have fulfilled to the latter his sacred testament.

The great spring 1975 offensive which culminated in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign is the victory of the entire anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation, of our people's national liberation cause. It is the outcome of several decades of unabated struggle and an inevitable development at the ripe moment of the entire anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation. We have brought into play all the factors of victory of the resistance war, of which the most fundamental and most decisive was our party's correct and creative leadership which has inherited, stirred up and developed the invincible strength of mastery in each Vietnamese and the entire nation in the new era.

Our symposium has studied the great historical event of the country, the spring 1975 general offensive and uprising. This also means that we have to focus our study on the anti-U.S. resistance war in its final stage.

In studying this great victorious general offensive and uprising, we should place it in the context of the entire anti-U.S. struggle, of which it was the peak. Its great victory as well as the success of the party's strategic leadership are concentrated manifestations of the strength of the entire resistance war and the most prominent success of the art of defeating the U.S. imperialists in the final stage of the war.

The strength of the anti-U.S. war of resistance is the strength of the entire nation combined with the strength of our time. It is also the aggregate strength in all fields, political, military, economic, moral, ideological, material and technical, the strength of our talent and wisdom in leadership and command, and the strength of the dynamism and creativeness of our people and armed forces.

Our party has worked out correct political, military and foreign policies and creatively and successfully settled all questions relating to the strategy of revolution, the war strategy and the military strategy. Thanks to its clear-sighted leadership in each period we have been able to mobilize and develop that strength to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists.

Therefore, in studying this historical general offensive and uprising it is necessary to clearly understand all questions concerning our revolutionary strategy, war strategy and military strategy in the fight against U.S. imperialism for national salvation as well as their dialectical relations. This is an important methodological question that needs to be firmly grasped during our scientific study.

Due to the limited time of this conference, I shall confine myself to the main issues:

1. On the revolutionary strategy.

First of all the success of our anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation has resulted from our party's correct and creative revolutionary strategy and tactics suited to the characteristics of the Vietnamese revolution and the world situation at the time.

We all know that after our people's resistance war against the French colonialists ended victoriously with the complete liberation of the north, the U.S. imperialists replaced the French, established their undisputed rule over the south and turned it into a colony of the new type. Many questions were then posed for the Vietnamese revolution, which were also questions for the world revolution. The correct assessment of the U.S. imperialists' strength and their capability to provoke a large-scale war has had a great effect on the stepping up of our people's revolutionary struggle as well as the world people's struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

Today, looking back at the war, we can see more clearly that the biggest questions facing our revolution at that time were whether the north should embark right away on the period of socialist revolution or should wait for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution in the south; whether the south should go ahead with its national liberation revolution or lay in "permanent ambush" and wait until the north is strong enough in its socialist construction? If the revolution in the south is to be promoted, by which method should it proceed, peaceful or armed struggle? If we opt for the violent method which means to proceed from the political struggle of the masses to armed uprisings and the liberation war, could we preserve peace in the north? In the event of the war spreading to the north, could it be developed into a regional war and jeopardize world peace that we need to preserve?

With a firm grasp of the Marxist-Leninist theory on revolution, our party correctly assessed the U.S. imperialists strong points and weaknesses as well as the characteristics of their neo-colonialism and their counterrevolutionary strategy on the world and more particularly in Vietnam, Indochina and Southeast Asia. We accepted the historic confrontation with the ring-leader of imperialism and were determined to step up the revolution in both the north and the south and at the same time adopted flexible tactics, mindful to take appropriate steps in order to accelerate the Vietnamese revolution while contributing to the nation's revolutionary movement to defend world peace. That was actually the line of carrying out simultaneously and closely coordinating the two revolutionary strategies in the two zones of our country, namely the strategy of national people's democratic revolution in the south and the strategy of socialist revolution in the north. Our party confirmed: "The socialist revolution in the north and the national people's democratic revolution in the south belong to two different strategies, which are closely associated with and interacted on each other, and helped each other to move forward...."

The socialist revolution in the north plays the most decisive role in the development of the entire revolution of our country.... The national people's democratic revolution in the south has the direct and decisive impact on the cause of liberating the south from the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys' yoke to achieve peaceful national reunification and fulfill the task of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country.¹

Acting upon this revolutionary strategy, our party set out flexible revolutionary tactics suited to the balance of forces in Vietnam, Indochina and Southeast Asia as well as to the international situation with a view to rallying the great majority of the people to our cause and isolating the enemy to the highest possible extent so as to win partial victories, before winning the final victory.

Besides, our party adopted a correct foreign policy, established a strategic militant alliance with the two fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea on the Indochinese Peninsula and enjoyed great assistance from the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries as well as the sympathy and support from the entire progressive mankind, the American people included.

The above-said revolutionary strategy and tactics are concrete manifestations of a consistent line throughout the revolution led by our party, a line of combining and upholding at the same time the banners of national independence and socialism, of correctly and creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the practical conditions of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, a line characterized by strict adherence to the principles but flexibility in tactics. With that line, the Vietnamese revolution has evinced the radiant truth of our time, i.e., national independence and socialism are indissolubly associated; it has also reflected the close combination of our people's fight for national salvation with the three revolutionary currents in the world and the combination of the Vietnamese people's basic requirements with the noble aspirations of the whole progressive mankind namely peace, national independence and socialism.

Our party's revolutionary strategy and tactics brought about a mighty revolutionary force serving as the firm foundation to launch and successfully develop a revolutionary war against the United States for national salvation. They served as the compass for all our activities in the war and our war strategy and military tactics in the whole country as well as in each zone.

2. On the war strategy.

In the anti-U.S. resistance of our people, the south was the big frontline and the north was the big rear. Because of the different characters of the revolution and the people's war in each zone, the resistance war was carried out in the form of two different wars which, however, were organically linked together: the liberation war in the south and the war to defend socialism in the north. On the basis of the above-said revolutionary strategy and tactics and of the law of the people's war in Vietnam, our party worked out and constantly developed in its practical leadership a war strategy with a common content for the resistance war in the whole of the country and specific contents for each zone.

1. The Third Party Congress' document, Vol 1, pp 34,35.

That was the strategy of an all-people and all-round war; of combining armed struggle with political struggle in three strategic areas (mountain area, rural area and urban area--ed.) on the big southern frontline; combining combat with production and support for the front in the big northern rear; effecting the offensive strategy by means of our aggregate strength; forming a strategic militant alliance with the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea; winning international assistance; and carrying out a protracted fight to gain partial victories before achieving the final victory. This war strategy saw a new development compared with that in the anti-French resistance, and its peak was strikingly demonstrated in the heightening conclusion of the coup de grace in the spring 1975 victory in distintegrating more than 1 million enemy troops and sweeping away U.S. neo-colonialism from South Vietnam.

That development was made possible by the new conditions in the country brought about by the combined influence of the two revolutions in the north and the south undertaken in line with the above-said strategy and tactics. It also reflected, on the military plane, the basic contents of the revolutionary method in the national people's democratic revolution in the south to topple neo-colonialism and defeat the U.S. imperialists' neo-colonialist war of aggression.

By then, the all-people and all-round war had developed to a very high level with very rich contents. In the matter of strategic leadership, we stepped up the liberation war in the south, closely combining it with the people's war to defend socialism in the north in all circumstances, thus creating a leaping development of our forces. Moreover, we knew how to create and seize the opportunity to achieve strategic turning points in our favour, defeating all frantic steps of war escalation by the U.S. imperialists in both the south and the north in order to gain ever bigger victories.

In the strategic leadership for the liberation war in the south, our party knew how to use correctly revolutionary violence and how to coordinate various forces and various forms of struggle in order to create a great aggregate strength. The armed force and the political force were our two fundamental forces. Armed struggle and political struggle were our two basic forms of struggle. The revolution in the south developed from partial uprisings into a revolutionary war. But even after the uprisings had developed into a war, uprisings still continued to break out in close combination with the war. Armed uprising was a special form of the political struggle. The uprisings in the southern war were different from the partial uprisings in the August revolution. They took place at a time when the revolution already had a strong military force and resistance bases and rear, when the enemy had a colossal war machine with a large army equipped with modern weapons and when fighting between the two opposing armies had reached a high degree of fierceness. The political struggle and uprisings of the masses in the process of the revolutionary war in the south were always closely combined with the armed struggle and military attacks. That combination was effected in different forms suitable for each strategic area

and each period of the resistance war. In the spring 1975 general offensive and uprising, the masses uprisings also differed from each locality and each point of time. Armed attacks usually preceded uprisings creating favourable conditions for the revolutionary masses to rise up and throw the puppet army and administration into confusion, making it possible to combine armed attack with uprising.

Military struggle is the basic form of war. It has its own law which, however, does not operate on its own but in close association with the political struggle, armed uprisings and other forms of struggle. Military struggle played an increasing role in developing the uprisings into war. As the law of war and the law of uprisings were brought into play and exerted mutual effect, the law of war played a more and more prominent role and finally decided the outcome of war.

It is because we know how to use the combined strength of the whole country, the strength of the socialist revolution in the north and the strength of the national people's democratic revolution in the south to use and combine all forces and forms of struggle that we were able to create a great aggregate strength to carry out the offensive strategy. If we had depended entirely on purely military factors and the army the revolutionary war in the south would not have been able to apply the offensive strategy, still less develop its offensive when the United States massively introduced its troops into South Vietnam, constantly raised its troop level there and escalated its war of aggression to the highest degree.

However, in the practical conditions of South Vietnam at that time when we had to use a small force to fight against a big enemy force, we could not carry out the offensive strategy to gain victory within a short period of time. Instead, we had to develop our offensive position by going from small to large attacks, from the local to the national scale in a protracted war, staking on time to build up our forces as we fought and to grow up in the process before attaining complete victory.

The strategy of our anti-U.S. war of resistance for national salvation is a strategy of protracted war, of limiting the war geographically to reasonable confines (we were determined to defeat the enemy in the south and prevent the war from spreading to the north, to defeat the enemy in Vietnam without making the war spill over into other regions), of standing up to the enemy even during its war escalation then forcing it to deescalate the war, of repulsing the enemy step by step and overthrowing it part by part, before winning complete victory. We firmly grasped the strategic principle of protracted war at the same time creating and seizing opportunities to launch strategic offensives to change the war situation, defeating the enemy step by step, "fighting till the Americans have to quit" and "till the puppet administration is toppled," launching a general offensive and uprising and achieving final victory at the earliest date possible.

It can be said that the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of our party have scaled the height of the art of leading a revolutionary war in the anti-U.S. resistance. That leadership closely combined the war strategy with revolutionary strategies and tactics. The war strategy and the leadership in the

conduct of the anti-U.S. war of resistance encompassed not only military factors but also the revolutionary strategy, tactics and method applied according to the law of war and the law of military struggle in people's warfare in Vietnam.

3. On the military strategy.

The victory of the anti-U.S. resistance is also the outcome of our party's correct settlement of the questions relating to the military strategy--the main component of the military art. The military strategy must comply with the revolutionary strategy and tactics of people's war, and with the specific law of the armed struggle.

The military strategy of our anti-U.S. resistance war has successfully resolved the practical and theoretical problems of the armed struggle and of the coordination of armed struggle with other forms of struggle, in order to achieve the political objectives of the war and of the revolution.

That is the strategy of "involving the entire people in the fight against the enemy," using the three categories of armed forces as the core to attack the enemy in two types of warfare (i.e., the guerrilla war now also known as local people's war, and the conventional war, now also known as the war conducted by main-force units), fighting the enemy in the three strategic areas in South Vietnam (the mountain area, the rural areas and the urban area), carrying out a three-prong offensive (military attack, political struggle and agitation among enemy troops), closely combining military offensive with political offensive and with diplomatic offensive when conditions are ripe. These are actually the secrets which make up the aggregate strength of the military art to defeat the enemy on the battlefield throughout the war as well as in each specific strategic circumstance. This military strategy found a concentrated expression in the war of liberation in South Vietnam and also concrete expressions in the people's war to defend socialist construction in North Vietnam.

The art of involving the entire people in the fight against the enemy and using the three categories of armed forces and the two types of warfare constitutes a traditional characteristic of the Vietnamese military art. This military art made a long stride forward in the anti-U.S. resistance thanks to the revolutionary strategy and tactics and the people's war strategy against U.S. aggressors and also to the favourable conditions created by the quick development of the people's armed forces in both zones of the countries. This development, in its turn, had its origins in the achievements of our people in the socialist transformation and construction in the north, of the people's national and democratic revolution in the south and of no less importance, in the creation of the strategic supply route along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" by land and by sea. As a result, successive steps forward were made in the building of the three categories of armed forces and in combining the two types of warfare on the southern battlefield.

Relying on the aggregate strength of the revolution and people's war in both the north and the south of the country and taking advantage of our posture of all-round strategic offensive, we succeeded in applying a coherent strategy of military offensive during the resistance war against the U.S. aggressors

for national salvation even though in the first years of the war, our people's armed forces remained small and poorly equipped and even after the United States had vigorously escalated the war and massively brought in its troops to South Vietnam. This was an evident reality on the South Vietnam battlefield but very hard to understand for those "classical" strategists who used to see a war through simple military factors, especially those who see the war as an affair between two regular armies.

The overriding thought behind the military offensive strategy is to combine the destruction of enemy troops with the seizure of control, to seize control in order to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy in order to have an ever firmer control. This reflects the unity between the demand of the revolutionary struggle (to seize power) and the law of the armed struggle (to destroy the enemy). It is also the unity of the demand of the armed struggle combined with political struggle (to destroy the enemy and seize power at the same time and it also stems from demand of the armed struggle itself in a people's war (the entire people, not only the armed forces, fight against the enemy; all the three categories of armed forces, not only the mobile regular forces seize control and mount attacks. [as received] In order to destroy the enemy and seize control, it is necessary to closely coordinate the actions of the military force with those of the political force, armed struggle with political struggle, offensive with uprisings, use a strong mobile force to mount large-scale annihilation attacks and to use strong on-the-spot forces to mount small and intermediate scale annihilation attacks, causing large-scale disintegration of the enemy power and coordinating with the local people to defend the land and fight against the enemy wherever they are present.

The military offensive strategy determines the operational forms in all domains, strategy, campaign, and tactics, chiefly attack and counterattack operations, attacks are conducted in all spheres, strategy, campaign and tactics; counterattacks in campaign and possible strategic operations, but defence is chiefly in the tactical sphere.

Together with the people, the three categories of our armed forces have created many tactics and many efficient ways of attack such as guerrilla warfare, concentrated attack, attack by special force or commando units, attack against airports, rear bases, transport and communications system, central offices and headquarters which house the "precious" forces of the enemy, or to form "anti-U.S. belts," etc.

In this way our people and armed forces have brought into play our own methods of combat, forcing the enemy to fight the way we wanted them to, thus preventing them from making use of their superiority in weapons and technique and their numerical strength in terms of unit. Also in this way we have simultaneously defeated the strategies of the United States and Saigon armies which outnumbered our armed forces and had advanced technical equipment.

Our military offensive was constantly coordinated with political offensive and uprisings by the population in all the three strategic regions. The most striking expression of this coordination was the "three strategic blows" of people's war in south Vietnam.

They were the offensive (or counter-offensive) campaigns conducted by our regular army in the mountainous or jungle region, the combined campaign of military offensives and uprisings of the population in the populous rural areas, and the broad political struggle in the urban areas.

The military offensive combined with political offensive and uprisings by the people in the three strategic regions inevitably led to the general offensive and uprising, bringing the storm of the revolutionary war into the cities which, in conjunction with the offensive and uprisings in the countryside and mountain regions, completely smashed the enemy army and the puppet power, victoriously ending the war.

Our party has successfully solved a series of questions relating to the revolutionary strategy, the war strategy, and the military strategy in a special period of history of the Vietnamese revolution, and achieved a great victory in the historic confrontation with the imperialist chieftain of our time. That is because our party has firmly believed in the immense strength of the masses of each Vietnamese, of the Vietnamese nation as a whole, because it has known how to bring forth the inexhaustible capabilities of the people and their creativeness in order to step up the revolutionary struggle, conduct the people's war, and solve in a creative way the problems of the Vietnamese military art.

The strength of our nation in the anti-U.S. war for national salvation has been accumulated through a 21-year-long struggle against the U.S. aggressors, through 45 years of revolutionary struggle of our nation under the party's leadership. It also is the crystallization of our nation's strength through 4,000 years of national construction and defence. It is the might of the whole country from the north to the south, of all battlefields, the combined military and political strength, the strength of offensive and uprisings in the three strategic regions, of the war conducted by main-force units as well as by the local forces and people....

While studying the components of the great victory of the anti-U.S. resistance in general and of the victory of the general offensive and uprisings in the spring of 1975 in particular, we must correctly assess the role and position of each component, at the same time, consider it in the interaction among these components. We must not lay emphasis on one factor or another, or on one aspect or another.

The strategic questions discussed above, as well as the many lessons drawn from the resistance wars against the French and U.S. aggressors are invaluable.

In our present cause of building and defending our socialist homeland against the new aggressor enemy, we have to treasure and learn from the experiences already acquired so as to apply and develop them in a creative way to the new situation in our country.

With regard to the officers and men, in our army, they should learn from the lesson of methodology so as to correctly and creatively settle the present questions of military science and art in a way conformable with our party's economic and military policies in the period of building and defending the

country. We must always bear in mind that the root of all our victories lies in our heroic people, our heroic nation, the widespread mass revolutionary movement under our party's leadership. We must proceed from that root, treasure our historical experiences while studying the modern military science and the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces in order to enrich our own knowledge and experience in order to develop Vietnam's military science and art along the correct path with a view to achieving new and more brilliant successes.

CSO: 4200/794

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VFF SPONSORS TEACH-IN ON VICTORY OVER FASCISM

OW151821 Hanoi VNA in English 1710 GMT 15 Apr 85

[Text] Hanoi, 15 Apr (VNA)--A teach-in on the victory over fascism was arranged here recently by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front with the participation of many front leaders, public figures, and intellectuals.

Taking the floor, Colonel Pham Ngoc Phung, head of the history department of the Higher Military Institute, pointed to the cause and characteristics of World War II as well as the great sacrifices made by the Soviet Red Army and people in their patriotic war against fascism to defend the socialist homeland and save the humankind from the fascist disaster.

He brought out the historical magnitude of the victory which had changed the face of the world and led to the emergence of the socialist system, and the development of the movement for national liberation and of the international communist and workers movement.

The participants exchanged views on the significance of the victory over Hitler fascism and Japanese militarism, which had paved the way for the victory of the Vietnamese August revolution in 1945. They agreed that in the face of the present tense situation caused by the U.S. imperialists' stepped-up arms race, it is necessary for everyone to heighten their vigilance and strengthen their solidarity with the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist community and the world progressive people in the struggle for peace.

CSO: 4200/794

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

LEADERS GO TO POLLS--Elections to the municipal and provincial people's councils for the 1985-89 term in all of Vietnam were crowned with success on Sunday [21 April]. In Hanoi, Le Duan, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee; Truong Chinh, president of the State Council; Pham Van Dong, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and many other senior party and state officials went to the poll in Ba Dinh Precinct, where the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum is located. Voters in all the provinces throughout the country including members of ethnic groups in the northern border provinces of Hoang Lien Son, Ha Tuyen, Lai Chau, and Lang Son enthusiastically took part in the elections. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 22 Apr 85]

INDEPENDENCE ORDER--The State Council of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has decided to confer Independence Order on families and those who have laid down their lives for national independence and freedom in the wars against foreign invasion in the past few decades. The conferment will be carried out as from 2 September 1985, the 40th National Day of the SRV. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 23 Apr 85]

CSO: 4200/833

7 May 1985

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

VNA CARRIES ARTICLE ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

OW221225 Hanoi VNA in English 0734 GMT 22 Apr 85

[VNA supplement by Vu Quoc Tuan, economist, dated April 22, 1985: "Use of Combined Strength Helps Improve Economic Management"]

[Text] [no dateline received] Notable achievements have been obtained in the implementation of socio-economic plans over recent years in Vietnam as a result of the exploitation of four potentials.

These potentials are: (1) the abilities of each branch of activity, each locality and each grassroots organization, (2) economic cooperation, (3) the import-export trade, and (4) the material equipment supplied by the higher echelons.

1. The first potential is the great reserve of land, manpower, productive ability, the possibility of increasing productivity, rationalising production, applying technological advances and using new industries and crafts.

The Mekong delta provinces have strong position not only in wet rice farming--with rather high yield and large acreage--but also in industrial crops (soy bean, peanut, coconut and sesame) and in aquatic products, particularly shrimps for export.

To increase rice yield, these provinces need more fertilizer insecticide, fuel and spare parts of tractors, which can be obtained by renewing the structure of plants and rapidly increase farm products for export.

Kien Giang Province abounds in coconut, pepper, cashew, pineapple and sesame, other provinces in Rambutan, orange, mandarin and lemon which may be exchanged at home and abroad.

In industry, local abilities are still great. The work force and the capacity of machines and equipment have not yet been fully used. Of late, many enterprises have exploited local abilities aimed at four objectives (applying technological advances, observing thrift, improving the managerial structure and promoting the mass movement), as a result, production has developed at a fairly rapid rate. In 1984, enterprises run by the industrial service of Ho Chi Minh City increased their production by 55 percent compared with 1983,

surpassing the plan by 22.6 percent while the equipment supplied by the higher levels only met 44 percent of the requirement (20 percent by the central bodies and 24 by the city). Those enterprises used imported equipment to produce goods for export to obtain foreign currency to buy raw materials for production. The pattern here is: quality-cooperation-regeneration.

2. Economic cooperation, cooperation between industrial crop farmers and establishments processing farm products (sugar-cane, tobacco, tea, jute, peanut and soy bean) is widening not because of the necessity of linking farming and processing into a process along the line of socialist production aimed at ensuring the quantity and quality of industrial products, but also of the interests of the industrial crop farmers, so as to do away with the situation in which those who produced raw materials lost in their undertakings whereas those who processed goods got big profits.

By exchanging goods with peasants many southern provinces have speeded up the development of valuable industrial crops. Thanks to cooperation, the No. 2 United Cigarette Enterprise has provided itself with the necessary cigarette paper, trade mark paper, filter tips and other things to ensure the fulfillment of its 1984 plan.

The United Bicycle Enterprises have economic ties with one hundred establishments in 12 provinces and cities. Many centrally-run enterprises help the provinces build new production establishments. In 1984, many refresher factories, cigarette, alcohol, shrimp fritter, wafer, and glass factories were built in many southern provinces.

3. Import-export, in application of the "on spot export" formula, the factories have the right to decide on the plan for selling its products to obtain foreign currency and using that money to buy raw materials for reproduction.

Many localities, by exporting farm produce (mainly industrial crops and fruits and vegetables), have been able to buy raw materials and equipment for agriculture, mainly fertilizer, fuel, cement, steel and consumer goods.

Cuu Long Province has decided that lobsters and copra are its two main export products. The rearing of lobsters for export has become a mass movement there. Binh Tri Thien is increasing the exploitation of algae for export.

Ha Bac and other provinces with joint contributions by the state, collective and private sectors, are promoting the production of export goods in cooperation with localities and other units and by importing raw materials and technical facilities.

4. Material equipment supplied by the higher echelons.

In each period, all material resources of the localities and units are concentrated to form the economic structure of each branch and each locality.

Models of a judicious use of the material means supplied by the higher echelons are being multiplied, thereby creating new possibilities for economic development in each locality and unit.

CSO: 4200/833

END